The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
Open accessAbstract
Recent work proposed the concept of backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs), where misclassification rules are hidden inside normal models, only to be triggered by very specific inputs. However, these "traditional" backdoors assume a context where users train their own models from scratch, which rarely occurs in practice. Instead, users typically customize "Teacher" models already pretrained by providers like Google, through a process called transfer learning. This customization process introduces significant changes to models and disrupts hidden backdoors, greatly reducing the actual impact of backdoors in practice. In this paper, we describe latent backdoors, a more powerful and stealthy variant of backdoor attacks that functions under transfer learning. Latent backdoors are incomplete backdoors embedded into a "Teacher" model, and automatically inherited by multiple "Student" models through transfer learning. If any Student models include the label targeted by the backdoor, then its customization process completes the backdoor and makes it active. We show that latent backdoors can be quite effective in a variety of application contexts, and validate its practicality through real-world attacks against traffic sign recognition, iris identification of volunteers, and facial recognition of public figures (politicians). Finally, we evaluate 4 potential defenses, and find that only one is effective in disrupting latent backdoors, but might incur a cost in classification accuracy as tradeoff.
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Cites
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Cited by
Li, Y., Jiang, Y., Li, Z., & Xia, S.-T. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2022.3182979 · Cited by 682
Flower: A Friendly Federated Learning Research Framework
Beutel, D. J., Topal, T., Mathur, A., Qiu, X., Fernandez-Marques, J., Gao, Y., Sani, L., Li, K. H., Parcollet, T., de Gusmão, P. P. B., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2007.14390 · Cited by 622
Privacy and Robustness in Federated Learning: Attacks and Defenses
Lyu, L., Yu, H., Ma, X., Chen, C., Sun, L., Zhao, J., Yang, Q., & Yu, P. S. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2022.3216981 · Cited by 548
Reflection Backdoor: A Natural Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks
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Weight Poisoning Attacks on Pretrained Models
Kurita, K., Michel, P., & Neubig, G. (2020) · Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics · doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.249 · Cited by 354
Metadata
- Authors
- Yao, Y., Li, H., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-11-06
- Pages
- 2041-2055
- OpenAlex
- W2985913519
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 16.03
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Yao, Y., Li, H., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y. (2019). Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354209
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