Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 343

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks

Open access
Yao, Yuanshun, Li, Huiying, Zheng, Haitao, Zhao, Ben Y.·2019·Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Recent work proposed the concept of backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs), where misclassification rules are hidden inside normal models, only to be triggered by very specific inputs. However, these "traditional" backdoors assume a context where users train their own models from scratch, which rarely occurs in practice. Instead, users typically customize "Teacher" models already pretrained by providers like Google, through a process called transfer learning. This customization process introduces significant changes to models and disrupts hidden backdoors, greatly reducing the actual impact of backdoors in practice. In this paper, we describe latent backdoors, a more powerful and stealthy variant of backdoor attacks that functions under transfer learning. Latent backdoors are incomplete backdoors embedded into a "Teacher" model, and automatically inherited by multiple "Student" models through transfer learning. If any Student models include the label targeted by the backdoor, then its customization process completes the backdoor and makes it active. We show that latent backdoors can be quite effective in a variety of application contexts, and validate its practicality through real-world attacks against traffic sign recognition, iris identification of volunteers, and facial recognition of public figures (politicians). Finally, we evaluate 4 potential defenses, and find that only one is effective in disrupting latent backdoors, but might incur a cost in classification accuracy as tradeoff.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3319535.3354209

Cites

43 of 43 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 43 references

Cited by

See all 343

Metadata

Authors
Yao, Y., Li, H., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2019-11-06
Pages
2041-2055
OpenAlex
W2985913519
Cited by
343
References
43
FWCI
16.03
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3319535.3354209
The paper
Yao, Y., Li, H., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y. (2019). Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354209

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.