Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Attestation is a fundamental building block to establish trust over software systems. When used in conjunction with trusted execution environments, it guarantees the genuineness of the code executed against powerful attackers and threats, paving the way for adoption in several sensitive application domains. This paper reviews remote attestation principles and explains how the modern and industrially well-established trusted execution environments Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone and AMD SEV, as well as emerging RISC-V solutions, leverage these mechanisms.
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In the citing paper
“A third party, besides the user and host, could perform the attestation [26,29].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Remote attestation [25,29] enables the user (a.k.a.confidential workload owner) to ascertain the level of trust/integrity of a remote TEE prior to transmitting sensitive data/code.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“It enables the owner to authenticate the hardware, validate the trusted state of a distant TEE, and determine whether the intended program is operating securely within the TEE.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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Citations
Cites
Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey
Pinto, S., & Santos, N. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3291047 · Cited by 505
SIGMA: The ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE Protocols
Krawczyk, H. (2003) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24 · Cited by 382
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3342195.3387532 · Cited by 379 · cited 2×
“Keystone [33] is a modular framework that provides the building blocks to create trusted execution environments, rather than providing an all-in-one so-lution that is inflexible and is another fixed design point.”
BackgroundPrinciples of remote attestation
Coker, G., Guttman, J., Loscocco, P., Herzog, A., Millen, J., O’Hanlon, B., Ramsdell, J., Segall, A., Sheehy, J., & Sniffen, B. (2011) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-011-0124-7 · Cited by 241 · cited 1×
“Remote attestation allows to establish trust between different devices and provides cryptographic proofs that the executing software is genuine and untampered [18].”
BackgroundPioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Shi, E., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., & Khosla, P. (2005) · Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1095810.1095812 · Cited by 228
Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation
Maene, P., Götzfried, J., de Clercq, R., Müller, T., Freiling, F., & Verbauwhede, I. M. R. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2017.2647955 · Cited by 166 · cited 1×
“We complement previous work [36, 37] with an updated analysis of TEEs (e.”
MethodEnhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities
Brickell, E., & Li, J. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society · doi:10.1145/1314333.1314337 · Cited by 152 · cited 1×
“Finally, the verifier examines the signature of the evidence (Fig.3-(cid:200) ) using the Intel attestation service (IAS) [5, 14].”
MethodA Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Subramanyan, P., Sinha, R., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S., & Seshia, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134098 · Cited by 119 · cited 1×
“While the quoting enclave, the microcode and XuCode are closed-source, recent work analysed the TEE and its attestation mechanism formally [50, 45].”
BackgroundSecTEE: A Software-based Approach to Secure Enclave Architecture Using TEE
Zhao, S., Zhang, Q., Qin, Y., Feng, W., & Feng, D. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363205 · Cited by 103 · cited 1×
“Nevertheless, researchers proposed several variants of one-way remote attestation protocols for Arm TrustZone [56, 34], as well as mutual remote attestation [2, 48], thus extending the built-in capabilities of the architecture for attestation.”
BackgroundTIMBER-V: Tag-Isolated Memory Bringing Fine-grained Enclaves to RISC-V
Weiser, S., Werner, M., Brasser, F., Malenko, M., Mangard, S., & Sadeghi, A. (2019) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23068 · Cited by 99 · cited 2×
“TIMBER-V [54] achieved the isolation of execution on small embedded processors thanks to hardware-assisted memory tagging.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Costan, V., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S.: Sanctum: minimal hardware extensions for strong software isolation. In: USENIX Security 2016 (2016)
Cited by
A Holistic Approach for Trustworthy Distributed Systems with WebAssembly and TEEsPreprint
Ménétrey, J., Grüter, A., Yuhala, P., Oeftiger, J., Felber, P. A., Pasin, M., & Schiavoni, V. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.05863 · Cited by 66
Self-citationWaTZ: A Trusted WebAssembly Runtime Environment with Remote Attestation for TrustZone
Ménétrey, J., Pasin, M., Felber, P. A., & Schiavoni, V. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs54860.2022.00116 · Cited by 64
“Recent work addresses the remote attestation mechanisms and protocols, including for IoT and edge devices [4], [39]–[44].”
BackgroundSelf-citationSoK: A Systematic Review of TEE Usage for Developing Trusted Applications
Paju, A., Javed, M., Nurmi, J., Savimäki, J., McGillion, B., & Brumley, B. B. (2023) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3600160.3600169 · Cited by 45
“[117] for systemising knowledge of TEE attestation applications.”
BackgroundAdvancing Federated Learning through Verifiable Computations and Homomorphic Encryption
Zhang, B., Lu, G., Qiu, P., Gui, X., & Shi, Y. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25111550 · Cited by 36
Atlas: A Framework for ML Lifecycle Provenance & Transparency
Spoczynski, M., Melara, M. S., & Szyller, S. (2025) · IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) · doi:10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00058 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Ménétrey, J., Göttel, C., Khurshid, A., Pasin, M., Felber, P., Schiavoni, V., & Raza, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Neuchâtel (CH)
- RISE Research Institutes of Sweden (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Ménétrey, Jämes
- ORCID
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- LNCS-13272
- Pages
- 95-113
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W4282034673
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 4.98
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- remote attestation, trusted execution environments, Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, RISC-V, hardware security, trusted computing
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- Ménétrey, J., Göttel, C., Khurshid, A., Pasin, M., Felber, P., Schiavoni, V., & Raza, S. (2022). Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16092-9_7
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