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Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Open accessAbstract
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) see rising use in devices from embedded sensors to cloud servers and encompass a range of cost, power constraints, and security threat model choices. On the other hand, each of the current vendor-specific TEEs makes a fixed set of trade-offs with little room for customization. We present Keystone---the first open-source framework for building customized TEEs. Keystone uses simple abstractions provided by the hardware such as memory isolation and a programmable layer underneath untrusted components (e.g., OS). We build reusable TEE core primitives from these abstractions while allowing platform-specific modifications and flexible feature choices. We showcase how Keystone-based TEEs run on unmodified RISC-V hardware and demonstrate the strengths of our design in terms of security, TCB size, execution of a range of benchmarks, applications, kernels, and deployment models.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-04-15
- Pages
- 1-16
- OpenAlex
- W3021475380
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 20.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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