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Cyber-Physical Inconsistency Vulnerability Identification for Safety Checks in Robotic Vehicles

Choi, Hongjun, Kate, Sayali, Aafer, Yousra, Zhang, Xiangyu, Xu, Dongyan · 2020 · Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We propose a new type of vulnerability for Robotic Vehicles (RVs), called Cyber-Physical Inconsistency. These vulnerabilities target safety checks in RVs (e.g., crash detection). They can be exploited by setting up malicious environment conditions such as placing an obstacle with a certain weight and a certain angle in the RV's trajectory. Once exploited, the safety checks may fail to report real physical accidents or report false alarms (while the RV is still operating normally). Both situations could lead to life-threatening consequences. The root cause of such vulnerabilities is that existing safety checks are mostly using simple range checks implemented in general-purpose programming languages, which are incapable of describing the complex and delicate physical world. We develop a novel technique that requires the interplay of program analysis, vehicle modeling, and search-based testing to identify such vulnerabilities. Our experiment on 4 real-world control software and 8 vehicles including quadrotors, rover, and fixed-wing airplane has discovered 10 real vulnerabilities. Our technique does not have false positives as it only reports when an exploit can be generated.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3372297.3417249

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 27 references

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Choi, H., Kate, S., Aafer, Y., Zhang, X., & Xu, D.
Affiliations
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
  • University of Waterloo (CA)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-10-30
Pages
263-278
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3109892785
Cited by
27
References
27
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2
FWCI
2.16
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • NSF (1901242 and 1910300)
  • IARPA TrojAI (W911NF-19-S-0012)
  • Sandia National Lab (1701331)
  • Office of Naval Research (N000141712045, N000141410468 and N000141712947)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Software Testing and Debugging Techniques
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Keywords
robotic vehicle, safety inspection, accident detection, vulnerability detection, false alarms, program analysis, vehicle modeling, search-based testing, quadrotor, rover, fixed-wing aircraft, control software

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