Cyber-Physical Inconsistency Vulnerability Identification for Safety Checks in Robotic Vehicles
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose a new type of vulnerability for Robotic Vehicles (RVs), called Cyber-Physical Inconsistency. These vulnerabilities target safety checks in RVs (e.g., crash detection). They can be exploited by setting up malicious environment conditions such as placing an obstacle with a certain weight and a certain angle in the RV's trajectory. Once exploited, the safety checks may fail to report real physical accidents or report false alarms (while the RV is still operating normally). Both situations could lead to life-threatening consequences. The root cause of such vulnerabilities is that existing safety checks are mostly using simple range checks implemented in general-purpose programming languages, which are incapable of describing the complex and delicate physical world. We develop a novel technique that requires the interplay of program analysis, vehicle modeling, and search-based testing to identify such vulnerabilities. Our experiment on 4 real-world control software and 8 vehicles including quadrotors, rover, and fixed-wing airplane has discovered 10 real vulnerabilities. Our technique does not have false positives as it only reports when an exploit can be generated.
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“Robotic systems are prone to various vulnerabilities [132, 133] that can affect their performance in terms of connectivity, productivity, operations, and accuracy.”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [133]
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Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
“Robotic systems are prone to various vulnerabilities [132, 133] that can affect their performance in terms of connectivity, productivity, operations, and accuracy.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Choi, H., Kate, S., Aafer, Y., Zhang, X., & Xu, D.
- Affiliations
- Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
- University of Waterloo (CA)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-10-30
- Pages
- 263-278
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3109892785
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 2.16
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- NSF (1901242 and 1910300)
- IARPA TrojAI (W911NF-19-S-0012)
- Sandia National Lab (1701331)
- Office of Naval Research (N000141712045, N000141410468 and N000141712947)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Software Testing and Debugging Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- robotic vehicle, safety inspection, accident detection, vulnerability detection, false alarms, program analysis, vehicle modeling, search-based testing, quadrotor, rover, fixed-wing aircraft, control software
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