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Secure Single-Server Aggregation with (Poly)Logarithmic Overhead

Open access
Bell, James Henry, Bonawitz, Kallista A., Gascón, Adrià, Lepoint, Tancrède, Raykova, Mariana · 2020 · Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Secure aggregation is a cryptographic primitive that enables a server to learn the sum of the vector inputs of many clients. Bonawitz et al. (CCS 2017) presented a construction that incurs computation and communication for each client linear in the number of parties. While this functionality enables a broad range of privacy preserving computational tasks, scaling concerns limit its scope of use. We present the first constructions for secure aggregation that achieve polylogarithmic communication and computation per client. Our constructions provide security in the semi-honest and the semi-malicious settings where the adversary controls the server and a δ-fraction of the clients, and correctness with up to δ-fraction dropouts among the clients. Our constructions show how to replace the complete communication graph of Bonawitz et al., which entails the linear overheads, with a k-regular graph of logarithmic degree while maintaining the security guarantees. Beyond improving the known asymptotics for secure aggregation, our constructions also achieve very efficient concrete parameters. The semi-honest secure aggregation can handle a billion clients at the per-client cost of the protocol of Bonawitz et al. for a thousand clients. In the semi-malicious setting with 10 4 clients, each client needs to communicate only with 3% of the clients to have a guarantee that its input has been added together with the inputs of at least 5000 other clients, while withstanding up to 5% corrupt clients and 5% dropouts. We also show an application of secure aggregation to the task of secure shuffling which enables the first cryptographically secure instantiation of the shuffle model of differential privacy.

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Metadata

Authors
Bell, J. H., Bonawitz, K. A., Gascón, A., Lepoint, T., & Raykova, M.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-10-30
Volume
2020
Pages
1253-1269
OpenAlex
W3037821247
Cited by
438
References
19
FWCI
16.63
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Secure Single-Server Aggregation with (Poly)Logarithmic Overhead. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3372297.3417885
The paper
Bell, J. H., Bonawitz, K. A., Gascón, A., Lepoint, T., & Raykova, M. (2020). Secure Single-Server Aggregation with (Poly)Logarithmic Overhead. Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417885

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