The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbation
Abstract
Deep learning models have consistently outperformed traditional machine learning models in various classification tasks, including image classification. As such, they have become increasingly prevalent in many real world applications including those where security is of great concern. Such popularity, however, may attract attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities of the deployed deep learning models and launch attacks against security-sensitive applications. In this paper, we focus on a specific type of data poisoning attack, which we refer to as a \em backdoor injection attack. The main goal of the adversary performing such attack is to generate and inject a backdoor into a deep learning model that can be triggered to recognize certain embedded patterns with a target label of the attacker's choice. Additionally, a backdoor injection attack should occur in a stealthy manner, without undermining the efficacy of the victim model. Specifically, we propose two approaches for generating a backdoor that is hardly perceptible yet effective in poisoning the model. We consider two attack settings, with backdoor injection carried out either before model training or during model updating. We carry out extensive experimental evaluations under various assumptions on the adversary model, and demonstrate that such attacks can be effective and achieve a high attack success rate (above 90%) at a small cost of model accuracy loss with a small injection rate, even under the weakest assumption wherein the adversary has no knowledge either of the original training data or the classifier model.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks
Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., & Hinton, G. E. (2017) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3065386 · Cited by 112,155
ImageNet: A large-scale hierarchical image database
Deng, J., Dong, W., Socher, R., Li, L.-J., Li, K., & Fei-Fei, L. (2009) · 2009 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2009.5206848 · Cited by 65,333
Gradient-based learning applied to document recognition
Lecun, Y., Bottou, L., Bengio, Y., & Haffner, P. (1998) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/5.726791 · Cited by 58,805
Intriguing properties of neural networks
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., & Fergus, R. (2013) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1312.6199 · Cited by 8,143
DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., & Frossard, P. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2016.282 · Cited by 5,317 · cited 4×
“Specifically, following the derivation introduced in the Deepfool algorithm [38], at each iteration we compute the minimum perturbation matrix [∆vi ] that projects the current data point to the boundary of the approximated polyhedron edge between the given class c and the target class t .”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPractical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3052973.3053009 · Cited by 3,495
Catastrophic forgetting in connectionist networks
French, R. (1999) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01294-2 · Cited by 2,311
Neural Networks: Tricks of the Trade: Second Edition
(2012) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35289-8 · Cited by 2,116
Huang, L., Joseph, A. D., Nelson, B., Rubinstein, B. I. P., & Tygar, J. D. (2011) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelligence · doi:10.1145/2046684.2046692 · Cited by 1,194 · cited 1×
“However, the prevalence of deep learning models in applications where security is of great concern provides new attack venues for adversaries to exploit [18].”
BackgroundTargeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning
Chen, X., Liu, C., Li, B., Lu, K., & Song, D. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1712.05526 · Cited by 1,039 · cited 5×
“However, we notice that their generated trojan trigger or backdoor is not visually stealthy enough to not be detected, although various techniques (e.g., blending backdoor with original image [9], improving trigger transparency [32]) have been applied.”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Cited by
Li, Y., Jiang, Y., Li, Z., & Xia, S.-T. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2022.3182979 · Cited by 682
Can You Really Backdoor Federated Learning?
Sun, Z., Kairouz, P., Suresh, A. T., & McMahan, H. B. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1911.07963 · Cited by 348
“Under targeted attacks (often referred to as backdoor attacks) (10; 19; 17), the goal of the adversary is to ensure that the learned model behaves differently on certain targeted sub-tasks while maintaining good overall performance on the primary task.”
BackgroundInvisible Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks via Steganography and Regularization
Li, S., Xue, M., Zhao, B., Zhu, H., & Zhang, X. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2020.3021407 · Cited by 310
Wild Patterns Reloaded: A Survey of Machine Learning Security against Training Data Poisoning
Cinà, A. E., Grosse, K., Demontis, A., Vascon, S., Zellinger, W., Moser, B. A., Oprea, A., Biggio, B., Pelillo, M., & Roli, F. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3585385 · Cited by 152
Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical
Carlini, N., Jagielski, M., Choquette-Choo, C. A., Paleka, D., Pearce, W., Anderson, H., Terzis, A., Thomas, K., & Tramèr, F. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00179 · Cited by 138
“…[10], [11], [17], [18], [22], [31], [54], [62], [86], [99], [106], [113], [26], [30], [37], [55], [56], [71], [80], [88], [91], [94], [101], [102], [115] [9], [20], [28], [34], [38], [40], [53], [72], [89], [100], [109]–[111], [29], [57], [65], [66], [73], [81] that first presumes an adversary can…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhong, H., Liao, C., Squicciarini, A. C., Zhu, S., & Miller, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-03-16
- Pages
- 97-108
- OpenAlex
- W3012113073
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 8.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3374664.3375751
- The paper
- Zhong, H., Liao, C., Squicciarini, A. C., Zhu, S., & Miller, D. (2020). Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbation. Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375751
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.