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Cited by 310

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks via Steganography and Regularization

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Li, Shaofeng, Xue, Minhui, Zhao, Benjamin, Zhu, Haojin, Zhang, Xinpeng·2020·IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing

Abstract

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been proven vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden features (patterns) trained to a normal model, which is only activated by some specific input (called triggers), trick the model into producing unexpected behavior. In this article, we create covert and scattered triggers for backdoor attacks, invisible backdoors, where triggers can fool both DNN models and human inspection. We apply our invisible backdoors through two state-of-the-art methods of embedding triggers for backdoor attacks. The first approach on Badnets embeds the trigger into DNNs through steganography. The second approach of a trojan attack uses two types of additional regularization terms to generate the triggers with irregular shape and size. We use the Attack Success Rate and Functionality to measure the performance of our attacks. We introduce two novel definitions of invisibility for human perception; one is conceptualized by the Perceptual Adversarial Similarity Score (PASS) and the other is Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS). We show that the proposed invisible backdoors can be fairly effective across various DNN models as well as four datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and GTSRB, by measuring their attack success rates for the adversary, functionality for the normal users, and invisibility scores for the administrators. We finally argue that the proposed invisible backdoor attacks can effectively thwart the state-of-the-art trojan backdoor detection approaches.

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Metadata

Authors
Li, S., Xue, M., Zhao, B., Zhu, H., & Zhang, X.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2020
Pages
1-1
ISSN
  • 1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0018
  • 2160-9209
OpenAlex
W3083185154
Cited by
310
References
53
FWCI
12.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks via Steganography and Regularization. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tdsc.2020.3021407
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Li, S., Xue, M., Zhao, B., Zhu, H., & Zhang, X. (2020). Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks via Steganography and Regularization. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2020.3021407

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