Cited by 435Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataCryptography and Data SecurityCloud Data Security Solutions

LDP-Fed: federated learning with local differential privacy

Truex, Stacey, Liu, Ling, Chow, Ka-Ho, Gursoy, Mehmet Emre, Wei, Wenqi·2020·Proceedings of the Third ACM International Workshop on Edge Systems, Analytics and Networking

Abstract

This paper presents LDP-Fed, a novel federated learning system with a formal privacy guarantee using local differential privacy (LDP). Existing LDP protocols are developed primarily to ensure data privacy in the collection of single numerical or categorical values, such as click count in Web access logs. However, in federated learning model parameter updates are collected iteratively from each participant and consist of high dimensional, continuous values with high precision (10s of digits after the decimal point), making existing LDP protocols inapplicable. To address this challenge in LDP-Fed, we design and develop two novel approaches. First, LDP-Fed's LDP Module provides a formal differential privacy guarantee for the repeated collection of model training parameters in the federated training of large-scale neural networks over multiple individual participants' private datasets. Second, LDP-Fed implements a suite of selection and filtering techniques for perturbing and sharing select parameter updates with the parameter server. We validate our system deployed with a condensed LDP protocol in training deep neural networks on public data. We compare this version of LDP-Fed, coined CLDP-Fed, with other state-of-the-art approaches with respect to model accuracy, privacy preservation, and system capabilities.

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Crossref · 10.1145/3378679.3394533

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21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Poisoning attacks can be broadly classified into untargeted poisoning attacks and targeted poisoning attacks.

    “Depending on the attacker's objective, poisoning attacks can be broadly classified into two categories: 1) untargeted poisoning attacks [123], [124], [125], [70], [67]; and 2) targeted poisoning attacks [126], [127], [35], [36], [128], [129], [130], [131].”
  • Known defenses to poisoning attacks in a centralized setting, such as robust losses and anomaly detection, assume control of the participants or explicit observation of the training data.

    “Known defenses to poisoning attacks in a centralized setting, such as robust losses [144] and anomaly detection [123], assume control of the participants or explicit observation of the training data.”

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Authors
Truex, S., Liu, L., Chow, K.-H., Gursoy, M. E., & Wei, W.
Affiliations
  • Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
  • Georgia Institute of Technology
Venue
Proceedings of the Third ACM International Workshop on Edge Systems, Analytics and Networking
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-04-27
Pages
61-66
OpenAlex
W3027749727
Cited by
435
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 51 · 2025: 97 · 2024: 108 · 2023: 83 · 2022: 56 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 8
FWCI
17.10
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The HKU Scholars Hub (University of Hong Kong) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
Keywords
federated learning, local differential privacy, parameter server, large-scale neural networks

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