Adversarial Examples on Object Recognition: A Comprehensive Survey
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Deep neural networks are at the forefront of machine learning research. However, despite achieving impressive performance on complex tasks, they can be very sensitive: Small perturbations of inputs can be sufficient to induce incorrect behavior. Such perturbations, called adversarial examples, are intentionally designed to test the network’s sensitivity to distribution drifts. Given their surprisingly small size, a wide body of literature conjectures on their existence and how this phenomenon can be mitigated. In this article, we discuss the impact of adversarial examples on security, safety, and robustness of neural networks. We start by introducing the hypotheses behind their existence, the methods used to construct or protect against them, and the capacity to transfer adversarial examples between different machine learning models. Altogether, the goal is to provide a comprehensive and self-contained survey of this growing field of research.
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Cites
Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., & Sun, J. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2016.90 · Cited by 235,474
Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks
Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.49 · Cited by 8,859
Intriguing properties of neural networks
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., & Fergus, R. (2013) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1312.6199 · Cited by 8,143
Adversarial examples in the physical world
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., & Bengio, S. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security · doi:10.1201/9781351251389-8 · Cited by 5,375
DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., & Frossard, P. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2016.282 · Cited by 5,317 · cited 2×
“L-BFGS [161] x x x *** *** *** *** Deep Fool [123] x x x * *** *** *** UAP [120] x x x *** ** *** ** Carlini [26] x x x x *** *** *** *** FGS [65] x x x * * ** *** JSMA [130] x x x x * *** ** *** STA [79] x x x ** *** * * SV-UAP [91] x x x * *** ** * RSSA [165] x x x * * *** *** BPDA [4] x x x *** *** *** *** Elastic-…”
BackgroundThe Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.36 · Cited by 3,993
Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3052973.3053009 · Cited by 3,495
Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images
Nguyen, A., Yosinski, J., & Clune, J. (2014) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1412.1897 · Cited by 3,258
Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images
Nguyen, A., Yosinski, J., & Clune, J. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2015.7298640 · Cited by 3,258
Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O., & Frossard, P. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2017.17 · Cited by 2,680
Cited by
Membership Inference Attacks on Machine Learning: A Survey
Hu, H., Salcic, Z., Sun, L., Dobbie, G., Yu, P. S., & Zhang, X. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3523273 · Cited by 564
Adversarial Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection Systems: A Comprehensive Survey
He, K., Kim, D. D., & Asghar, M. R. (2023) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3233793 · Cited by 450
Ahmad, K., Maabreh, M., Ghaly, M., Khan, K., Qadir, J., & Al-Fuqaha, A. (2022) · Computer Science Review · doi:10.1016/j.cosrev.2021.100452 · Cited by 291
Beyond generalization: a theory of robustness in machine learning
Freiesleben, T., & Grote, T. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04334-9 · Cited by 106
“…papers on ML robustness rather focus only on specific robustness notions, such as adversarial robustness (Dong et al., 2020; Dreossi et al., 2019; Serban et al., 2020), robustness to natural distribution shifts (Drenkow et al., 2021; Hendrycks et al., 2021; Koh et al., 2021; Taori et al.,…”
BackgroundAdversarial Attacks Against Deep Generative Models on Data: A Survey
Sun, H., Zhu, T., Zhang, Z., Jin, D., Xiong, P., & Zhou, W. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2021.3130903 · Cited by 90
“elaborated on adversarial examples, including their construction, defense strategies, and transfer capabilities [26].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Serban, A., Poll, E., & Visser, J.
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2020-06-12
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1-38
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W3035584216
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 7.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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