Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols

Open access
Jacomme, Charlie, Kremer, Steve · 2021 · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security

Abstract

Passwords are still the most widespread means for authenticating users, even though they have been shown to create huge security problems. This motivated the use of additional authentication mechanisms in so-called multi-factor authentication protocols. In this article, we define a detailed threat model for this kind of protocol: While in classical protocol analysis attackers control the communication network, we take into account that many communications are performed over TLS channels, that computers may be infected by different kinds of malware, that attackers could perform phishing, and that humans may omit some actions. We formalize this model in the applied pi calculus and perform an extensive analysis and comparison of several widely used protocols—variants of Google 2-step and FIDO’s U2F (Yubico’s Security Key token). The analysis is completely automated, generating systematically all combinations of threat scenarios for each of the protocols and using the P ROVERIF tool for automated protocol analysis. To validate our model and attacks, we demonstrate their feasibility in practice, even though our experiments are run in a laboratory environment. Our analysis highlights weaknesses and strengths of the different protocols. It allows us to suggest several small modifications of the existing protocols that are easy to implement, as well as an extension of Google 2-step that improves security in several threat scenarios.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3440712

Cites

18 of 18 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so the self-check wasn’t run.

Citations

Cites

Show all 17 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Google 2018. Google 2 Step Verification.Retrieved January 2018 from https://www.google.com/landing/2step/. Google 2018. Google 2 Step Verification.Retrieved January 2018 from https://www.google.com/landing/2step/.
  2. Robert Künnemann and Graham Steel. 2013. YubiSecure? Formal Security Analysis Results for the Yubikey and YubiHSM. Springer Berlin 257--272. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38004-4_17 · DOI
  3. Olivier Pereira , Florentin Rochet , and Cyrille Wiedling . 2017 . Formal analysis of the Fido 1.x protocol . In Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Foundations 8 Practice of Security,Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer. Olivier Pereira, Florentin Rochet, and Cyrille Wiedling. 2017. Formal analysis of the Fido 1.x protocol. In Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Foundations 8 Practice of Security,Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer.
  4. Yubico 2018. FIDO Yubikey . Retrieved January 2018 from https://www.yubico.com/solutions/fido-u2f/. Yubico 2018. FIDO Yubikey. Retrieved January 2018 from https://www.yubico.com/solutions/fido-u2f/.

Cited by

See all 60

Metadata

Authors
Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S.
Affiliations
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Venue
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
Published
2021-01-21
Volume
24
Issue
2
Pages
1-34
ISSN
  • 2471-2566 (ISSN-L)
  • 2471-2574
OpenAlex
W3125712971
Cited by
51
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 4
FWCI
3.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • ANR (Sequoia)
  • ERC (No 645865-SPOOC)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
multi-factor authentication, authentication protocols, applied pi calculus, threat model, ProVerif, malware, phishing, human error, password security

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3440712
The paper
Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S. (2021). An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3440712

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.