An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Passwords are still the most widespread means for authenticating users, even though they have been shown to create huge security problems. This motivated the use of additional authentication mechanisms in so-called multi-factor authentication protocols. In this article, we define a detailed threat model for this kind of protocol: While in classical protocol analysis attackers control the communication network, we take into account that many communications are performed over TLS channels, that computers may be infected by different kinds of malware, that attackers could perform phishing, and that humans may omit some actions. We formalize this model in the applied pi calculus and perform an extensive analysis and comparison of several widely used protocols—variants of Google 2-step and FIDO’s U2F (Yubico’s Security Key token). The analysis is completely automated, generating systematically all combinations of threat scenarios for each of the protocols and using the P ROVERIF tool for automated protocol analysis. To validate our model and attacks, we demonstrate their feasibility in practice, even though our experiments are run in a laboratory environment. Our analysis highlights weaknesses and strengths of the different protocols. It allows us to suggest several small modifications of the existing protocols that are easy to implement, as well as an extension of Google 2-step that improves security in several threat scenarios.
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Citations
Cites
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850 · cited 1×
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BackgroundSpectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Horn, J., Fogh, A., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., et al. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00002 · Cited by 1,780
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“When designing an authentication protocol, as also emphasized in [6], a key requirement should be usability.”
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BackgroundMobile values, new names, and secure communication
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“For our formal analysis, we model protocols in a dialect of the applied pi calculus [17], [18] that is used as input language by the PROVERIF tool [19] which we use to automate the analysis.”
BackgroundMethodDigital identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle management
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“For our formal analysis, we model protocols in a dialect of the applied pi calculus [17], [18] that is used as input language by the PROVERIF tool [19] which we use to automate the analysis.”
MethodMobile values, new names, and secure communication
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Automated analysis of security protocols with global state
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“Some other attempts to automatically analyse multi-factor authentication protocols were made, including for instance the analysis of FIDO’s U2F [20], the Yubikey One Time Password [16, 17], and the Secure Call Authorization protocols [3].”
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“Some other attempts to automatically analyse multifactor authentication protocols were made, including for instance the analysis of FIDO’s U2F [7], the Yubikey One Time Password [8], [9] and the Secure Call Authorization protocols [10].”
MethodA Complete Characterization of Secure Human-Server Communication
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Cited by
Ramezanpour, K., & Jagannath, J. (2022) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109358 · Cited by 216
“Various MFA mechanisms (especially 2-factor) has become the mainstream in existing security systems, particularly using hardware/software tokens and bio-metrics for human subjects [26–28].”
Hirsi, A., Audah, L., Salh, A., Alhartomi, M. A., Rasheed, H., Ahmed, S., & Tahir, A. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3393548 · Cited by 138
An Efficient Key Management and Multi-Layered Security Framework for SCADA Systems
Upadhyay, D., Zaman, M., Joshi, R., & Sampalli, S. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2021.3104531 · Cited by 54
Role of Building Automation Technology in Creating a Smart and Sustainable Built Environment
Singh, D., & Singh, A. (2023) · Evergreen · doi:10.5109/6781101 · Cited by 33
E-Banking Security Study—10 Years Later
Malinka, K., Hujňák, O., Hanáček, P., & Hellebrandt, L. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3149475 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Published
- 2021-01-21
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 2471-2566 (ISSN-L)
- 2471-2574
- OpenAlex
- W3125712971
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 4
- FWCI
- 3.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- inria.hal.science
- Locations
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- ANR (Sequoia)
- ERC (No 645865-SPOOC)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- multi-factor authentication, authentication protocols, applied pi calculus, threat model, ProVerif, malware, phishing, human error, password security
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