The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols
Open accessAbstract
Passwords are still the most widespread means for authenticating users, even though they have been shown to create huge security problems. This motivated the use of additional authentication mechanisms in so-called multi-factor authentication protocols. In this article, we define a detailed threat model for this kind of protocol: While in classical protocol analysis attackers control the communication network, we take into account that many communications are performed over TLS channels, that computers may be infected by different kinds of malware, that attackers could perform phishing, and that humans may omit some actions. We formalize this model in the applied pi calculus and perform an extensive analysis and comparison of several widely used protocols—variants of Google 2-step and FIDO’s U2F (Yubico’s Security Key token). The analysis is completely automated, generating systematically all combinations of threat scenarios for each of the protocols and using the P ROVERIF tool for automated protocol analysis. To validate our model and attacks, we demonstrate their feasibility in practice, even though our experiments are run in a laboratory environment. Our analysis highlights weaknesses and strengths of the different protocols. It allows us to suggest several small modifications of the existing protocols that are easy to implement, as well as an extension of Google 2-step that improves security in several threat scenarios.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Ramezanpour, K., & Jagannath, J. (2022) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109358 · Cited by 216
“Various MFA mechanisms (especially 2-factor) has become the mainstream in existing security systems, particularly using hardware/software tokens and bio-metrics for human subjects [26–28].”
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An Efficient Key Management and Multi-Layered Security Framework for SCADA Systems
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Role of Building Automation Technology in Creating a Smart and Sustainable Built Environment
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E-Banking Security Study—10 Years Later
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Evaluating the Security Posture of Real-World FIDO2 Deployments
Kuchhal, D., Saad, M., Oest, A., & Li, F. (2023) · Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3576915.3623063 · Cited by 22
A Formal Analysis of the FIDO2 Protocols
Guan, J., Li, H., Ye, H., & Zhao, Z. (2022) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-17143-7_1 · Cited by 19
A Security Protection Technology Based on Multi-factor Authentication
Guo, Y., Liang, Y., Zhuang, Y., Liao, R., Liang, D., Liu, F., Xu, J., Luo, X., Li, X., Ke, W., et al. (2022) · International Conference on Mobile Networks and Wireless Communications (ICMNWC) · doi:10.1109/icmnwc56175.2022.10032006 · Cited by 17
“The model is formalized in applying the pi-calculus, and the analysis is fully automated, systematically generating all combinations of threat scenarios for each protocol, and using the P ROVERIF tool for automated protocol analysis [3].”
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“More recent research has conducted a formal analysis of multi-factor authentication methods provided by Google, revealing some weaknesses in their protocols (Jacomme and Kremer, 2021).”
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Pöhn, D., Gruschka, N., Ziegler, L., & Büttner, A. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103515 · Cited by 12
Mahdad, A. T., Jubur, M., & Saxena, N. (2024) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3658644.3690286 · Cited by 10
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Realizing privacy aspects in blockchain networks
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“The two most common multi-factor authentication protocols [21] used by users are Google’s 2-Step authentication, Google Authenticator with OTPs, and FIDO’s U2F.”
MethodMultilayers Physical Authentication and NoSQL PRESENT algorithm for Data Center
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“Layered authentication is one way to reduce weaknesses and improve system accuracy [12].”
BackgroundDesign and Evaluation of Cross-Cloud Authentication Protocol based on Raft Consensus Algorithm
Mao, Y., & Liu, Z. (2025) · International Conference on Intelligent Systems and Computational Networks (ICISCN) · doi:10.1109/iciscn64258.2025.10934309 · Cited by 1
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Raghu, A. (2025) · International Journal of Computational and Experimental Science and Engineering · doi:10.22399/ijcesen.2068 · Cited by 1
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BackgroundInfluentialReview on Three-Factor Authorization based on different IoT Devices
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Guiding the Digital Transformation of Supply Chains
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Published
- 2021-01-21
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 2471-2566 (ISSN-L)
- 2471-2574
- OpenAlex
- W3125712971
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 4
- FWCI
- 3.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- inria.hal.science
- Locations
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- ANR (Sequoia)
- ERC (No 645865-SPOOC)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- multi-factor authentication, authentication protocols, applied pi calculus, threat model, ProVerif, malware, phishing, human error, password security
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