Automated analysis of security protocols with global state
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols – sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite (msr) rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a “low-level” specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol.
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Citations
Cited by
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2016) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000004 · Cited by 321
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
“‡§ [26] Tamarin∗‡ [27] d SAPIC [28] CI-AtSe [29] OFMC.”
BackgroundAn Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols
Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/3440712 · Cited by 51
“Some other attempts to automatically analyse multi-factor authentication protocols were made, including for instance the analysis of FIDO’s U2F [20], the Yubikey One Time Password [16, 17], and the Secure Call Authorization protocols [3].”
MethodSelf-citationMAC-in-the-Box: Verifying a Minimalistic Hardware Design for MAC Computation
Küennemann, R., & Nemati, H. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_26
Metadata
- Authors
- Kremer, S., & Künnemann, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Computer Security
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-08-03
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 583-616
- ISSN
- 0926-227X (ISSN-L)
- 1875-8924
- OpenAlex
- W2030988895
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Kremer, S., & Künnemann, R. (2016). Automated analysis of security protocols with global state. Journal of Computer Security. https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-160556
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