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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 26 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem

Open access
Costanza-Chock, Sasha, Raji, Inioluwa Deborah, Buolamwini, Joy · 2022 · 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency

Abstract

Algorithmic audits (or ‘AI audits’) are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may potentially exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

Overview

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TL;DR

This paper provides a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem, combining a catalog of 438 individuals and 189 organizations, 10 expert interviews, and a 152-response survey. It finds audits are growing but unstandardized, with broad support for mandatory audits, notification, and disclosure, and recommends six policy actions.

Key findings

  • The field scan identified 438 individuals from 189 organizations; the survey received 152 responses, including 56 auditors (12 first-party, 16 second-party, 11 third-party) and 96 non-auditors. Auditors report quantitative methods dominate: 77% assess algorithmic accuracy, fairness, and statistical soundness; 77% assess training-data quality; 51% assess harm-reporting systems; 51% assess the corporate/engineering environment.
  • Standards and tools are thin: only 7% say their audit process uses a standardized framework and set of tools; 38% use no pre-built AI audit tools; 75% describe AI audit regulation as “not or barely present.” There is strong consensus that audits should be mandated (95%) and that audit results should be disclosed in part or full (82%).
  • Disclosure and enforcement gaps are widespread: of 43 auditors asked, only 7 provided documentation and 4 linked to audit results; 80% recommended changes that were not implemented; 65% report auditees will not commit to address problems; 53% lack power to require pre-deployment changes; 51% lack power to require engineering-practice changes.
  • Harm and stakeholder practice lag stated importance: 65% self-report intersectional fairness assessments, but only 41% say stakeholder involvement is critical and only 4% (2 respondents) provide documentation of stakeholder involvement. Less than half assess whistleblower protection (24%), appeals processes (46%), environmental impact (37%), or unfair labor data sources (48%).

Methods

  • Design: a field scan, 10 semi-structured interviews with field leaders, and an anonymous online survey. The field scan yielded 438 individuals from 189 organizations; the survey was shared with contacts at all 189 organizations and later publicized via social media and the Algorithmic Justice League newsletter, open 9/23/2021–10/29/2021.
  • Sample: 152 survey responses; 56 auditors (12 first-party, 16 second-party, 11 third-party; respondents could select multiple roles), 96 non-auditors; other roles included 65 advocates, 96 researchers, 3 regulators, and 25 “other.” Geographic responses came primarily from the US (n=90), UK (n=16), and EU (n=18), with one response each from Africa, Asia, and South America and none from Australia.
  • Analysis: the paper reports descriptive survey counts and interview quotes/themes; no inferential statistical modeling is described.

Limitations

  • Stated: respondents may not represent the entire population of AI auditors; only 56 self-identified as having worked directly on audits; audits published after the survey closed were not included; geographic coverage is skewed toward the US, UK, and EU, with one response each from Africa, Asia, and South America and none from Australia; materials and outreach were in English and the team is US-based; the focus on professionalized auditors excludes community-based, participatory, or evocative audits; auditor demographic information was not collected.
  • Stated/evident: self-reported practices are often unverifiable because few auditors provided audit documentation or examples; first-, second-, and third-party auditor subsamples are small; recruitment was non-probability-based via email, LinkedIn, Twitter, and a newsletter, limiting generalizability.
  • Evident: the survey closed in 2021, so the rapidly changing audit ecosystem may have shifted since data collection; the paper itself calls for future work on the Global South and auditor demographics.

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Crossref · 10.1145/3531146.3533213

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 31 references

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. ACLU. 2020. Federal court rules ‘big data’ discrimination studies do not violate federal anti-hacking law. https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-rules-big-data-discrimination-studies-do-not-violate-federal-anti
  2. Elisha Anderson. 2020. Controversial Detroit facial recognition got him arrested for a crime he didn’t commit. Detroit Free Press (2020). https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/07/10/facial-recognition-detroit-michael-oliver-robert-williams/5392166002/
  3. Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Facing the Coded Gaze with Evocative Audits and Algorithmic Audits. Ph. D. Dissertation. Cambridge, MA, USA.
  4. Garance Burke, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman, and Michael Tarm. 2021. 4 Takeaways: AP Investigates Gunshot Detection Technology. Associated Press (2021). https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/4-takeaways-ap-investigates-gunshot-detection-technology
  5. Todd Feathers. 2022. College Prep Software Naviance Is Selling Advertising Access to Millions of Students. The Markup (2022). https://themarkup.org/machine-learning/2022/01/13/college-prep-software-naviance-is-selling-advertising-access-to-millions-of-students
  6. IATA. [n. d.]. IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA). Retrieved April 17, 2022 from https://www.iata.org/en/programs/safety/audit/iosa/#tab-5
  7. Josh Kenway, Camille François, Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Bug Bounties For Algorithmic Harms? Lessons from Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure for Algorithmic Harms Discovery, Disclosure, and Redress. Algorithmic Justice League, Washington, DC.
  8. Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner, and Julia Angwin. 2016. How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm. ProPublica (2016). https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm
  9. Emmanuel Martinez and Lauren Kirchner. 2021. The Secret Bias Hidden in Mortgage-Approval Algorithms. The Markup (2021). https://themarkup.org/denied/2021/08/25/the-secret-bias-hidden-in-mortgage-approval-algorithms
  10. Microsoft. [n. d.]. FATE: Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics in AI. Retrieved April 18, 2022 from https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/theme/fate/
  11. Dillon Reisman, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford, and Meredith Whittaker. 2018. Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public Agency. AI Now (2018). https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf
  12. Aaron Rieke, Urmila Janardan, Mingwei Hsu, and Natasha Duarte. 2021. Essential Work: Analyzing the Hiring Technologies of Large Hourly Employers. Upturn (2021). https://www.upturn.org/work/essential-work/
  13. Christian Sandvig, Kevin Hamilton, Karrie Karahalios, and Cédric Langbort. 2014. Auditing Algorithms : Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms. In “Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry,” a preconference at the 64th Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association (Seattle, WA, USA).

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Metadata

Authors
Costanza-Chock, S., Raji, I. D., & Buolamwini, J.
Affiliations
Algorithmic Justice League, USA
Venue
2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency
Publisher
ACM
Published
2022-06-20
Pages
1571-1583
OpenAlex
W4283168787
Cited by
277
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 95 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 5
FWCI
19.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
Keywords
algorithmic auditing, AI audit, algorithmic accountability, auditing standards, independent auditors, AI regulation, stakeholder engagement, audit disclosure

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3531146.3533213
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Costanza-Chock, S., Raji, I. D., & Buolamwini, J. (2022). Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency. https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533213

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