The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Open accessAbstract
ertification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem: The mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly nonconfidential results to depend on confidential input data.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines.
Clarke, D. A., & Minsky, M. L. (1968) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2313471 · Cited by 2,583
A lattice model of secure information flow
Denning, D. E. (1976) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/360051.360056 · Cited by 1,907
Self-citationA note on the confinement problem
Lampson, B. W. (1973) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/362375.362389 · Cited by 1,429
Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations
Bell, D. E., & LaPadula, L. J. (1973) · Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) · Cited by 1,017
Allen, F. E. (1970) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/390013.808479 · Cited by 738
Compiler construction for digital computers
Gries, D. J. (1971) · International Linear Collider · Cited by 504
Exception handling: issues and a proposed notation
Goodenough, J. B. (1975) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/361227.361230 · Cited by 496
Protection - Principles and practice
Graham, G., & Denning, P. J. (1972) · Managing Requirements Knowledge, International Workshop on · doi:10.1109/afips.1972.91 · Cited by 366
Self-citationProtection: principles and practice
Graham, G. S., & Denning, P. J. (1971) · Proceedings of the November 16-18, 1971, fall joint computer conference on - AFIPS '71 (Fall) · doi:10.1145/1478873.1478928 · Cited by 227
Self-citationSecurity controls in the ADEPT-50 time-sharing system
Weissman, C. (1969) · Proceedings of the November 18-20, 1969, fall joint computer conference on - AFIPS '69 (Fall) · doi:10.1145/1478559.1478574 · Cited by 158
Cited by
Weiser, M. (1984) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.1984.5010248 · Cited by 3,204
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P. D., & Sheth, A. N. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1924943.1924971 · Cited by 2,238
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Enck (2014) · doi:10.1145/2619091 · Cited by 1,203
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Myers, A. C. (1999) · Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/292540.292561 · Cited by 1,034
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Volpano, D., Irvine, C., & Smith, G. (1996) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-1996-42-304 · Cited by 969
Korel, B., & Laski, J. (1988) · Information Processing Letters · doi:10.1016/0020-0190(88)90054-3 · Cited by 759
Weiser, M. (1981) · doi:10.5555/800078.802557 · Cited by 695
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
Myers, A. C., & Liskov, B. (2000) · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · doi:10.1145/363516.363526 · Cited by 556
A decentralized model for information flow control
Myers, A. C., & Liskov, B. (1997) · Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/268998.266669 · Cited by 536
“Record and array assignments are similar to variable assignment, except that they may convey information by virtue of the particular record or array being assigned to. Consider record assignment of the form . In this statement, is a record expression with label , is a fieldof the record type with declared type , and i…”
InfluentialLIFT: A Low-Overhead Practical Information Flow Tracking System for Detecting Security Attacks
Qin, F., Wang, C., Li, Z., Kim, H.-S., Zhou, Y., & Wu, Y. (2006) · 2006 39th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO'06) · doi:10.1109/micro.2006.29 · Cited by 422
Abadi, M., Banerjee, A., Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. G. (1999) · Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/292540.292555 · Cited by 413
The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. G. (1998) · Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98 · doi:10.1145/268946.268976 · Cited by 410
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
Smith, G., & Volpano, D. (1998) · Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL '98 · doi:10.1145/268946.268975 · Cited by 406
Design and verification of secure systems
Rushby, J. M. (1981) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1067627.806586 · Cited by 364
Agat, J. (2000) · Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/325694.325702 · Cited by 340
Labels and event processes in the asbestos operating system
Efstathopoulos, P., Krohn, M., VanDeBogart, S., Frey, C., Ziegler, D., Kohler, E., Mazières, D., Kaashoek, F., & Morris, R. (2005) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1095809.1095813 · Cited by 330
A brief survey of program slicing
Xu, B., Qian, J., Zhang, X., Wu, Z., & Chen, L. (2005) · ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes · doi:10.1145/1050849.1050865 · Cited by 313
TAJ: effective taint analysis of web applications
Tripp, O., Pistoia, M., Fink, S. J., Sridharan, M., & Weisman, O. (2009) · Proceedings of the 30th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation · doi:10.1145/1542476.1542486 · Cited by 308
TaintDroid: an information flow tracking system for real-time privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P., & Sheth, A. N. (2014) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2494522 · Cited by 305
Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2002) · Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 · doi:10.1109/csfw.2000.856937 · Cited by 304
Observational determinism for concurrent program security
Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C. (2004) · 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/csfw.2003.1212703 · Cited by 270
RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Vachharajani, N., Bridges, M. J., Chang, J., Rangan, R., Ottoni, G., Blome, J. A., Reis, G. A., Vachharajani, M., & August, D. I. (2005) · 37th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO-37'04) · doi:10.1109/micro.2004.31 · Cited by 270
A type-based approach to program security
Volpano, D., & Smith, G. (1997) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0030629 · Cited by 225
Information flow control for secure cloud computing
Bacon, J., Eyers, D., Pasquier, T. F. J.-M., Singh, J., Papagiannis, I., & Pietzuch, P. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2013.122313.130423 · Cited by 105
Defeating Prompt Injections by Design
Debenedetti, E., Shumailov, I., Fan, T., Hayes, J., Carlini, N., Fabian, D., Kern, C., Shi, C., Terzis, A., & Tramèr, F. (2026) · 2026 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML) · doi:10.1109/satml68715.2026.00040 · Cited by 15
“This can be achieved through various methods, including static code analysis to formally verify program properties [21] and language-based security mechanisms, such as specialized type systems [59].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Denning, D. E., & Denning, P. J.
- Venue
- Communications of the ACM
- Published
- 1977-07
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 504-513
- ISSN
- 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7317
- OpenAlex
- W2129278597
- Cited by
- 1,029
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 7.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.