The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Abstract
Even well administered networks are vulnerable to attack. Recent work in network security has focused on the fact that combinations of exploits are the typical means by which an attacker breaks into a network. Researchers have proposed a variety of graph-based algorithms to generate attack trees (or graphs). Either structure represents all possible sequences of exploits, where any given exploit can take advantage of the penetration achieved by prior exploits in its chain, and the final exploit in the chain achieves the attacker's goal. The most recent approach in this line of work uses a modified version of the model checker NuSMV as a powerful inference engine for chaining together network exploits, compactly representing attack graphs, and identifying minimal sets of exploits. However, it is also well known that model checkers suffer from scalability problems, and there is good reason to doubt whether a model checker can handle directly a realistic set of exploits for even a modest-sized network. In this paper, we revisit the idea of attack graphs themselves, and argue that they represent more information explicitly than is necessary for the analyst. Instead, we propose a more compact and scalable representation. Although we show that it is possible to produce attack trees from our representation, we argue that more useful information can be produced, for larger networks, while bypassing the attack tree step. Our approach relies on an explicit assumption of monotonicity, which, in essence, states that the precondition of a given exploit is never invalidated by the successful application of another exploit. In other words, the attacker never needs to backtrack. The assumption reduces the complexity of the analysis problem from exponential to polynomial, thereby bringing even very large networks within reach of analysis
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Automated generation and analysis of attack graphs
Sheyner, O., Haines, J., Jha, S., Lippmann, R., & Wing, J. M. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004377 · Cited by 1,293
A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Phillips, C., & Swiler, L. P. (1998) · Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms · doi:10.1145/310889.310919 · Cited by 828
Alert correlation in a cooperative intrusion detection framework
Cuppens, F., & Miege, A. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004372 · Cited by 696
Two formal analyses of attack graphs
Jha, S., Sheyner, O., & Wing, J. (2003) · Proceedings 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-15 · doi:10.1109/csfw.2002.1021806 · Cited by 494
Using model checking to analyze network vulnerabilities
Ritchey, R. W., & Ammann, P. (2002) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/secpri.2000.848453 · Cited by 444
Self-citationExperimenting with quantitative evaluation tools for monitoring operational security
Ortalo, R., Deswarte, Y., & Kaaniche, M. (1999) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/32.815323 · Cited by 404
A requires/provides model for computer attacks
Templeton, S. J., & Levitt, K. (2001) · Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms · doi:10.1145/366173.366187 · Cited by 373
Computer-attack graph generation tool
Swiler, L. P., Phillips, C., Ellis, D., & Chakerian, S. (2002) · Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition II. DISCEX'01 · doi:10.1109/discex.2001.932182 · Cited by 324
Cited by
A scalable approach to attack graph generation
Ou, X., Boyer, W. F., & McQueen, M. A. (2006) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1180405.1180446 · Cited by 617
Dynamic Security Risk Management Using Bayesian Attack Graphs
Poolsappasit, N., Dewri, R., & Ray, I. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2011.34 · Cited by 617
Practical Attack Graph Generation for Network Defense
Ingols, K., Lippmann, R., & Piwowarski, K. (2006) · 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06) · doi:10.1109/acsac.2006.39 · Cited by 379
An Attack Graph-Based Probabilistic Security Metric
Wang, L., Islam, T., Long, T., Singhal, A., & Jajodia, S. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70567-3_22 · Cited by 376
NICE: Network Intrusion Detection and Countermeasure Selection in Virtual Network Systems
Chung, C.-J., Khatkar, P., Xing, T., Lee, J., & Huang, D. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2013.8 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Ammann, P., Wijesekera, D., & Kaushik, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2002-11-18
- Pages
- 217-224
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2054127354
- Cited by
- 697
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 7.91
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.