Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 1,107

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks

Du, Wenliang, Deng, Jing, Han, Yunghsiang S., Varshney, Pramod K.·2003·Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

Abstract

To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption and authentication purposes must be agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is non-trivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. To solve the key pre-distribution problem, two elegant key pre-distribution approaches have been proposed recently [11, 7].In this paper, we propose a new key pre-distribution scheme, which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to the existing schemes. Our scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that any nodes other than these compromised nodes is affected is close to zero. This desirable property lowers the initial payoff of smaller scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a significant proportion of the network. We also present an in depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/948109.948118

Cites

21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 21 references

Cited by

See all 1,107

Metadata

Authors
Du, W., Deng, J., Han, Y. S., & Varshney, P. K.
Venue
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2003-10-27
Pages
42-51
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2117781301
Cited by
1,107
References
21
FWCI
45.38
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/948109.948118
The paper
Du, W., Deng, J., Han, Y. S., & Varshney, P. K. (2003). A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/948109.948118

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.