Cognition in the Vegetative State
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Awake but not aware: This puzzling dissociation of the two central elements of consciousness defines the vegetative state. Traditionally, this condition has been believed to imply a brain with preserved hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions but with no capacity for cortical cognitive processes. As is discussed in this review, over a 20-year span neuroimaging techniques have clearly demonstrated that this characterization of patients in a vegetative state is incorrect. Contrary to the initial belief, the “vegetative” brain can retain several high-level aspects of cognitive functions, across sensory modalities, including language processing and learning dynamics. Nonetheless, the residual cognitive functions observed in vegetative patients might reflect intact but functionally disconnected cortical modules that do not give rise to the subjective feeling of phenomenological awareness.
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Citations
Cites
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 1×
“The two conditions were matched in all perceptual respects, ensuring that any difference between the two could only reflect the process of actively holding in mind information through time, something that is considered to require conscious awareness (Dehaene & Naccache 2001).”
BackgroundCan cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?
POLDRACK, R. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004 · Cited by 2,249
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
Detecting awareness in the vegetative state
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1130197 · Cited by 1,978
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 1×
“This condition of decreased information integration might be the crucial factor underlying the absence of consciousness (Tononi 2004, 2008).”
BackgroundConsciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda, L. J.-F., Bruno, M.-A., Boveroux, P., Schnakers, C., Soddu, A., Perlbarg, V., Ledoux, D., Brichant, J.-F., et al. (2010) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awp313 · Cited by 911 · cited 1×
“Along these lines, for example, Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010) have shown that VS patients exhibit reduced resting-state connectivity, as compared to MCS patients and healthy volunteers, in proportion to the degree of consciousness impairment.”
BackgroundThe neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state
Laureys, S. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.010 · Cited by 813
Varieties of the locked-in syndrome
Bauer, G., Gerstenbrand, F., & Rumpl, E. (1979) · Journal of Neurology · doi:10.1007/bf00313105 · Cited by 504
The neuropathology of the vegetative state after an acute brain insult
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Cited by
Stender, J., Gosseries, O., Bruno, M.-A., Charland-Verville, V., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi, A., Chatelle, C., Thonnard, M., Thibaut, A., Heine, L., et al. (2014) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(14)60042-8 · Cited by 550
tDCS in patients with disorders of consciousness: Sham-controlled randomized double-blind study
Thibaut, A., Bruno, M.-A., Ledoux, D., Demertzi, A., & Laureys, S. (2014) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.0000000000000260 · Cited by 324
“These clinical improvements in long-standingMCS corroborate previous evidence for late recovery and neural plasticity in MCS.23,24 We observed no tDCS-related increase in CRS-R total scores in patients in VS/UWS, in line with previous studies showing more capacity for neural plasticity in patients in MCS.25 It could b…”
ResultFunctional geometry of the cortex encodes dimensions of consciousness
Huang, Z., Mashour, G. A., & Hudetz, A. G. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-35764-7 · Cited by 101
“1): (1) different neurofunctional dimensions of consciousness are represented by different cortical gradients, and the disruption of consciousness is associated with a degradation of one or more of the major cortical gradients, depending on the state; (2) cortical gradients construct a virtual multidimensional spacewh…”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Monti, M. M.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Clinical Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2012-04-27
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 431-454
- ISSN
- 1548-5943 (ISSN-L)
- 1548-5951
- OpenAlex
- W2114359844
- Cited by
- 83
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 1.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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