Corruption in Developing Countries
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists' ability to measure corruption. This in turn has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption? We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory but also that the effects of anticorruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents.
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Cites
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?
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Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
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Eight Questions about Corruption
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Cited by
Duflo, E., Greenstone, M., Pande, R., & Ryan, N. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt024 · Cited by 511
Self-citationBusting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027 · Cited by 443
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
Landry, P. F., Lü, X., & Duan, H. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414017730078 · Cited by 427
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/699209 · Cited by 308
Envirodevonomics: A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field
Greenstone, M., & Jack, B. K. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.1.5 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Olken, B. A., & Pande, R.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2012-09-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 479-509
- ISSN
- 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1391
- OpenAlex
- W3023880103
- Cited by
- 769
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 25.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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