Empirical Models of Lobbying
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain ( a) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and ( b) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Leech, B. L., & Kimball, D. C. (2009) · University of Chicago Press · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226039466.001.0001 · Cited by 1,296
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis
Mian, A., Sufi, A., & Trebbi, F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.1967 · Cited by 375
Self-citationInformational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
Schnakenberg, K. E. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12249 · Cited by 145
Cited by
Chater, N., & Loewenstein, G. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002023 · Cited by 710
Wealth Inequality in South Africa, 1993–2017
Chatterjee, A., Czajka, L., & Gethin, A. (2022) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhab012 · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2020-08-02
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 391-413
- ISSN
- 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1391
- OpenAlex
- W3130976394
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F. (2020). Empirical Models of Lobbying. Annual Review of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
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