Unawareness of Attitudes, Their Environmental Causes, and Their Behavioral Effects
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 158 of the 158 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 73 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Claims about unawareness are abundant in attitude research. This article provides an analysis of evidence regarding three aspects of an attitude of which people may lack awareness: ( a ) the attitude itself, ( b ) its environmental causes, and ( c ) its behavioral effects. Our analysis reveals that, despite widespread claims of unawareness of the three aspects, strong empirical evidence for these claims is surprisingly scarce. The article concludes with a discussion of the most likely aspects of attitudes that people may be unaware of; their relation to contextual factors that might influence evaluative responses outside of awareness; open questions about the (un)awareness of attitudes, their environmental causes, and their behavioral effects; and methodological recommendations for future research that aims to provide more compelling evidence for aspects of attitudes that may evade awareness.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This review analyzes evidence for unawareness of three aspects of attitudes—the attitude itself, its environmental causes, and its behavioral effects—and concludes that, despite widespread claims in the literature, strong empirical evidence for unawareness is surprisingly scarce. The authors argue that most apparent dissociations can be explained by methodological artifacts (reliability, sensitivity, timing, structural mismatch) or by unwillingness rather than inability to report.
Key findings
- For unawareness of attitudes, there is "no evidence supporting the idea that indirect measures such as the IAT, the EPT, and the AMP would capture attitudes that people are unaware of"; Hahn et al. (2014) found participants highly accurate at predicting their own IAT scores even though direct–indirect correlations remained small.
- For unawareness of environmental causes, the case for unaware evaluative conditioning (EC) is "generally unsupported" for low-strength stimuli and for high-strength stimuli with weak attention; Stahl et al. (2016) found EC effects in only 6 experiments/27 conditions when CS identification and attention were high, and Hödgen et al. (2018) found no EC for continuous-flash-suppressed CSs across four experiments.
- Mere exposure (ME) evidence is weaker than often stated for low-strength stimuli, moderate for high-strength stimuli with weak attention, and "comparatively strong" for high-strength stimuli with high attention but no conscious recollection; de Zilva et al. (2013) found 36% (experiment 1) and 64% (experiment 2) of participants were aware of supposedly suppressed stimuli.
- For unawareness of behavioral effects, "there is currently no direct empirical evidence" for attitudinal influences on low-level unintentional behaviors, and only one study (Gawronski et al. 2003) has used the high-motivation/high-ability control approach, with limitations leaving it open to alternative interpretations.
Methods
- Narrative/conceptual review organized around a three-part framework (attitude itself, environmental causes, behavioral effects), each assessed against the criterion of whether people can report the entity X and whether alternative explanations for discrepancies can be ruled out.
- Evidence reviewed covers physiological vs. self-report measures, indirect vs. direct measures (IAT, EPT, AMP), stated vs. revealed preferences, discrepant self-reports (types vs. tokens), and the EC and ME paradigms for environmental causes.
- The paper closes with a nine-item table of methodological recommendations for sound inferences of (un)awareness (e.g., do not conflate unawareness with other features of automaticity; check for unawareness rather than assuming procedures guarantee it; rule out unwillingness and nonevaluative confounds).
Limitations
- Stated by the paper: the analysis focused on general effects without considering individual differences in (un)awareness, though Hahn et al. (2014) showed considerable variability (some participants perfectly accurate, others extremely poor); the review did not address how people gain awareness of an attitude, its causes, or its effects; space constraints limited discussion to EC and ME, though other paradigms "face similar challenges"; and the analysis is agnostic about unrecognized influences in paradigms not typically seen as involving unawareness.
- Evident from the text: as a narrative review it does not report a systematic search or quantitative synthesis, and several conclusions rest on the authors' re-interpretation of individual studies (e.g., surprise at IAT feedback attributed to metric mismatch rather than unawareness) rather than on new data.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
12 Valid · 6 Not valid · 34 Not checked · 44 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“if responses on a physiological and a self-report measure do not align, a potential explanation is that the physiological measure captures responses along a dimension that is different from valence (i.e., sensitivity problem; see Shanks & St. John 1994).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Shanks & St. John 1994 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.3.2 explains that a mismatch between performance and self-report can arise when the measures pick up different information, and distinguishes this Information Criterion from differences in sensitivity to the same information. The paper does not say that a physiological measure captures a dimension other than valence, so the claim's specific explanation is not supported by this source. (LLM, conf=0.83)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“participants may be surprised about their IAT feedback not because they are unaware of their attitudes, but because the metric under- lying their verbal quantification does not match the metric underlying the verbal quantification in the feedback they receive (Gawronski 2019).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Gawronski 2019 source
The Discussion explains that surprise at IAT feedback can arise when the metric used to turn scores into verbal feedback differs from participants’ own metric for labeling their bias. It presents this as an alternative to the claim that participants are unaware of their attitudes. (LLM, conf=0.94)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“a high-powered replication of Olson & Fazio's (2001) original study found that EC effects in the surveillance task are driven by a subset of consciously encoded CS–US pairings (Kurdi et al. 2022, Moran et al. 2021).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Kurdi et al. 2022 source
Kurdi et al. (2022) describe Moran et al. (2021) as a registered replication of Olson & Fazio's (2001) surveillance task based on a large sample (N = 1,478 across 12 laboratories), satisfying the 'high-powered replication' description (THE SURVEILLANCE TASK AND THE REPLICATION BY MORAN ET AL. (2021)). Their reanalyses show the EC effect arose only among partially and fully aware participants (g = .36 and .31) and was absent in the fully unaware subgroup (g = .05, 95% CI [-.04, .13]) — EC EFFECTS AMONG FULLY AWARE, PARTIALLY AWARE, AND UNAWARE PARTICIPANTS — and conclude that the apparent unaware EC 'is due to the inclusion of partially aware participants' (Abstract; Classification Analysis section, p. null), i.e. driven by pairings consciously (partially) encoded. The only slight slant is that this conclusion is Kurdi et al.'s reanalysis of the replication's data rather than the replication's own finding, which the companion Moran et al. citation in the same sentence covers. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Partly supportedcites Moran et al. 2021 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper reports a high-powered close conceptual replication and, in the Results (pp. 6–7), EC effects among participants classified as aware; effects were not significant under three alternative criteria for excluding aware participants. But the Interpretation (p. 8) says retrospective awareness measures cannot establish whether participants consciously encoded the pairings, so the finding does not show that a subset of consciously encoded pairings drove the effects. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The high level of accuracy in the prediction of IAT scores appears to conflict with evidence that participants tend to be rather surprised when they receive feedback about their perfor- mance (e.g., when they learn that they have a strong preference for White over Black people; see Goedderz & Hahn 2022).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Goedderz & Hahn 2022 source
The paper’s Prediction Accuracy section reports significant correlations between predicted and actual IAT scores. Its Surprise at IAT Feedback section reports that participants who predicted their scores were less surprised by feedback than those who did not, supporting the cited contrast. The paper qualifies the surprise finding: it varies with whether participants first attend to their reactions or predict their scores. (LLM, conf=0.90)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“inferences of unawareness are undermined by the lack of awareness measures in prior research”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
53 more claims
Create a free account to see all 96 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 26
- Probably not a substantial claim. 14
Citations
Cites
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317
Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 · Cited by 9,210
Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and review of empirical research
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.84.5.888 · Cited by 7,611
Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure
Zajonc, R. B. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0025848 · Cited by 6,745
Bem, D. J. (1972) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60024-6 · Cited by 5,241
A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory
Jacoby, L. L. (1991) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/0749-596x(91)90025-f · Cited by 3,696
Science faculty’s subtle gender biases favor male students
Moss-Racusin, C. A., Dovidio, J. F., Brescoll, V. L., Graham, M. J., & Handelsman, J. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1211286109 · Cited by 3,150
Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena.
Bem, D. J. (1967) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0024835 · Cited by 2,959
Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0041593 · Cited by 2,945
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692 · Cited by 2,587
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- 2011, A vehicle for large-scale education about the human mind. In How Is the Internet Changing the Way You Think?, 392
- 2016, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People
- 2009, Implicit measurement of attitudes: a physiological approach, 485
- 2024, What is implicit bias?
- 2009, Induction: from simple categorization to higher-order inference problems, 93
- 2015, Social-cognitive theories, 65
- 2018, Living while black: Here are all the routine activities for which police were called on African-Americans this year, CNN
- 2007, Attitudes as mental and neural states of readiness: using physiological measures to study implicit attitudes, 125
- 2005, The measurement of attitudes, 21
- 2008, International affective picture system (IAPS): affective ratings of pictures and instruction manual
- 2019, Attitude structure and change, 117
Cited by
Self-reports are better measurement instruments than implicit measures
Corneille, O., & Gawronski, B. (2024) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-024-00376-z · Cited by 227
Self-citationDurand, F., Besson, T., Flaudias, V., & Zerhouni, O. (2025) · Food Quality and Preference · doi:10.1016/j.foodqual.2025.105460 · Cited by 19
Normative Beliefs for Older Adults and Volunteering Intentions
Wirth, M., Couto, M. C. P. D. P., Fung, H. H.-L., Pavlova, M. K., & Rothermund, K. (2025) · Gerontology · doi:10.1159/000543917 · Cited by 8
Navon, M., & Bar‐Anan, Y. (2025) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09567976251315689 · Cited by 4
“We exclude evaluation unawareness from our definition because of the limited evidence for such unawareness (Gawronski & Corneille, 2025).”
Evaluative Conditioning has a Vexing Demand Problem
Corneille, O., Gast, A., Lush, P., & Stahl, C. (2025) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.70080 · Cited by 5
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gawronski, B., & Corneille, O.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- UCLouvain (BE)
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2025-01-17
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 359-384
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W4402475435
- Semantic Scholar
- 9ef1cb9f2b69b20737a91bdfaba9b907a9fd06c5
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 145
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 11
- FWCI
- 1.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Psychometric Methodologies and Testing
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
- Keywords
- unconscious attitudes, evaluative responses, implicit attitudes, attitude-behavior relationship, contextual factors
- MeSH terms
- Attitude, Awareness, Humans
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