The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEOs
Abstract
This article starts with an overview of the characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs). I discuss the rising importance of general skills over firm-specific skills and the growing share of externally recruited CEOs. I also discuss possible reasons for the underrepresentation of women and the overrepresentation of family members in the corporate suite. I then review the three main explanations that have been put forward to explain the surge in CEO compensation over the past 30 years: principal-agent view, rent extraction view, and market-based view. I assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of these explanations in light of the existing empirical research. Finally, I review work on how entrenched CEOs or cognitively biased CEOs may cause corporate practices to deviate from the maximization of firm value.
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Citations
Cites
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Self-citationThe Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1351 · Cited by 2,373
Balanced Skills and Entrepreneurship
Lazear, E. P. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041301425 · Cited by 1,027
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Managerial myopia: Self-serving biases in organizational planning.
Larwood, L., & Whittaker, W. (1977) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.62.2.194 · Cited by 490
Agle, B. R., Nagarajan, N. J., Sonnenfeld, J. A., & Srinivasan, D. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.20785800 · Cited by 374
Cited by
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
CEO Career Variety: Effects on Firm-Level Strategic and Social Novelty
Crossland, C., Zyung, J., Hiller, N. J., & Hambrick, D. C. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0469 · Cited by 487
Overconfidence in Political Behavior
Ortoleva, P., & Snowberg, E. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130921 · Cited by 355
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., & Parsons, C. A. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs114 · Cited by 351
Political Connections and Allocative Distortions
SCHOENHERR, D. (2019) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12751 · Cited by 328
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2009-09
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 121-150
- ISSN
- 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1391
- OpenAlex
- W4231277419
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 10.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.