A Survey of Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 118 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 16 of the 122 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Self-sovereign identity is the next evolution of identity management models. This survey takes a journey through the origin of identity, defining digital identity and progressive iterations of digital identity models leading up to self-sovereign identity. It then states the relevant research initiatives, platforms, projects, and regulatory frameworks, as well as the building blocks including decentralized identifiers, verifiable credentials, distributed ledger, and various privacy engineering protocols. Finally, the survey provides an overview of the key challenges and research opportunities around self-sovereign identity.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This survey traces digital identity and access management from isolated and centralized models to self-sovereign identity, covering SSI building blocks, privacy engineering, platforms, regulations, and research. It argues SSI offers stronger user control and privacy but remains immature, with open challenges in key management, standards, governance, and adoption.
Key findings
- Existing identity models face data ownership/control problems, password overload (an average LastPass business user tracks 191 passwords), fragmentation, and breaches: 944 incidents affecting more than 3.3 billion records in the first half of 2018; over 16 million U.S. identity-fraud victims in 2017 with $16.8 billion in damages; and the 2017 Equifax incident affecting more than 146 million users.
- SSI is defined through Allen’s ten principles—existence, control, access, transparency, persistence, portability, interoperability, consent, minimization, and protection—and its architecture includes decentralized identifiers (DIDs), verifiable credentials, DPKI, blockchain/DLT, verifiable data registries, agents, identity hubs, and digital wallets; the paper notes 90 registered DID methods.
- Privacy engineering supplements SSI through trusted execution environments, secure multiparty computation and ring signatures, threshold secret sharing, and zero-knowledge proofs; ZKP supports selective disclosure, combining multiple verifiable credentials, and derived credentials without issuer involvement.
- The SSI ecosystem includes platforms such as Sovrin, Hyperledger Indy, uPort, Jolocom, and Veres One; technical groups such as W3C, DIF, RWoT, and ToIP; and regulations such as GDPR, PSD2, eIDAS, Privacy by Design, and CCPA, while challenges include standards, key management, consent fatigue, access, accountability/governance, trust in data, adoption, and commercialization.
Methods
- Survey/overview paper; no primary empirical study or experimental evaluation is reported.
- It synthesizes literature, standards, platforms, regulatory frameworks, and privacy protocols across identity/IAM evolution, SSI architecture, privacy engineering, ecosystem actors, regulations, and related work.
- Analysis is narrative and comparative, including discussion of prior SSI surveys and original SSI proposals rather than a systematic review protocol or dataset analysis.
Limitations
- The paper states SSI is still in its infancy, is not a panacea or silver bullet, and the ecosystem is rapidly expanding, so readers are referred to cited resources for the latest developments.
- The paper lists SSI challenges including standards for data management and wallets, key management, consent, access, accountability and governance, trust in data, new technology adoption, and investment/commercialization.
- Evident from the text: as a survey, it does not provide new empirical validation, and its coverage is selective—for example, the privacy engineering section describes only a selection of topics, and some cryptographic protocols are explicitly not covered in detail.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
15 Valid · 21 Not valid · 88 Not checked · 121 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Lack of adequate data ownership and control over digital identity data by users, in addition to the absence of adequate digital identity for over a billion individuals worldwide [1], have a major negative impact on users' privacy rights and access to services [2].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.1 (page not supplied) links limited user control over identity data to compromised privacy. Sections 6.2 and 7 report that lack of control discourages disclosure and participation in federated identity systems, but they do not establish a major negative impact on access to services generally or address data ownership as such. The separate claim about over a billion people is attached to [1], not this source. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“On the other hand, the permissionless and public model may be vulnerable to attacks common in various open DLT architectures [2].”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [2] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.4 discusses identity theft in digital identity management, and section 3.1 discusses control of personal information in federated systems. Neither addresses permissionless or public distributed ledgers or attacks on open DLT architectures. Searches for the claim’s wording and for blockchain, permissionless architectures, and attacks found no relevant passage in our copy; page numbers were not available. (LLM, conf=0.76)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
A statement the paper makes itself — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Depending on an organization's jurisdiction of operation and data stores, they may be subject to federal legislation that will require them to provide access to their customer data, without the consent of the customer.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“This concern led the Court of Justice of European Union in July 2021 to determine in the case of Data Protection Commission v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework for data transfers is not adequate.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites [3] 2020, Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner V. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The existing digital identity management models which rely on centralized data repositories and identity providers have led to a growing number of data breaches, causing significant loss of personal data and tremendous cost to all stakeholders and in particular the users.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
38 more claims
Create a free account to see all 245 claims and to verify the 52 references still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 192
- It may state two separate claims as one. 78
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 1. Introduction · p. 1
“This concern led the Court of Justice of European Union in July 2021 to determine in the case of Data Protection Commission v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework for data transfers is not adequate.”
§ References · p. 21
“[3] 'Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner V. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems,' 2020, https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=%20CELEX %3A62018CJ0311&qid=1616638710605 (visited on 03/26/ 2021).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Appendix · p. 20
“Decentralized identifier (DID): a globally unique and persistent identifier that does not need a centralized registration authority because it is generated cryptographically. See Section 4.2.”
§ 4. Architecture of Self-Sovereign Identity Model · p. 9
“4.1. Decentralized Identifiers.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Appendix · p. 21
“Distributed ledger technology (DLT): a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital data geographically spread across multiple locations. See Section 4.1.”
§ 4. Architecture of Self-Sovereign Identity Model · p. 11
“4.4. Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Appendix · p. 21
“Decentralized public key infrastructure (DPKI): a public key infrastructure that does not rely on the traditional certificate authorities for certificate generation but rather uses protocols such as DID to discover and verify public key descriptions. See Section 4.4.”
§ 4. Architecture of Self-Sovereign Identity Model · p. 10
“4.3. Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3. Identity and Access Management · p. 8
“Certain DLT systems are public, allowing any entity to read or write to the ledger, while others are permissioned and allow only a selection of authorized entities to read or write new records into the ledger.”
§ 4. Architecture of Self-Sovereign Identity Model · p. 11
“A permissioned blockchain provides read access to all parties; however, writing permission is only granted to a subset of entities.”
Cited works that were retracted
Works this paper cites that were later retracted, from the retraction notices publishers deposit. Major when the notice came out before this paper was published.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
“10.1016/j.matpr.2021.03.096”
Cited work 10.1016/j.matpr.2021.03.096 · retracted 2021-03-22 · notice 10.1016/j.matpr.2021.03.096 · this paper published 2021-07-17
Citations
Cites
1 retracted
(2021) · doi:10.1016/j.matpr.2021.03.096 · Cited by 26
RetractedShamir, A. (1979) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359168.359176 · Cited by 13,756 · cited 5×
“In 1979, Shamir [123] and Blakely [124] proposed two variations of threshold-based secret sharing schemes. scheme proposed by Shamir relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation, while Blakley’s proposal, also known as vector scheme, relies on the geometric concept of intersecting hyperplanes.”
BackgroundInfluentialErikson, E. H. (2026) · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.18614668 · Cited by 11,235
Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes
Shamir, A. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-39568-7_5 · Cited by 6,635
How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems
Fiat, A., & Shamir, A. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-47721-7_12 · Cited by 3,943 · cited 1×
“Other notable ZKP protocols include CL-signatures [131], Fiat Shamir [132], zkSNARKs [133], and zkSTARKs [134].”
BackgroundGoldreich, O., Micali, S., & Wigderson, A. (1987) · Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM conference on Theory of computing - STOC '87 · doi:10.1145/28395.28420 · Cited by 3,590 · cited 1×
“[113] extended Yao’s idea by providing a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the multiparty (mental game) problem under the assumption of the majority of parties being honest.”
BackgroundDifferential Privacy: A Survey of Results
Dwork, C. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79228-4_1 · Cited by 3,542 · cited 1×
“While not covered in detail in this survey, other notable cryptographic protocols include homomorphic cryptography [145], differential privacy [146], identity-based encryption [147], and commitment schemes [148] which may supplement a digital identity or data management systems.”
BackgroundSafeguarding cryptographic keys
BLAKLEY, G. R. (1979) · 1979 International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK) · doi:10.1109/mark.1979.8817296 · Cited by 3,499 · cited 2×
“In 1979, Shamir [123] and Blakely [124] proposed two variations of threshold-based secret sharing schemes. scheme proposed by Shamir relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation, while Blakley’s proposal, also known as vector scheme, relies on the geometric concept of intersecting hyperplanes.”
BackgroundProtocols for secure computations
Yao, A. C. (1982) · 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1982) · doi:10.1109/sfcs.1982.38 · Cited by 3,306
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., & Rackoff, C. (1989) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/0218012 · Cited by 3,285
Research works printed but not linked: 22
- S. Zuboff, 2019, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power: Barack Obama’s Books of 2019
- D. F. James, 1999, What is identity (as we now use the word)
- D. Birch, 2014, Identity Is the New Money (Perspectives)
- T. Itu, 1993, Telecommunication standardization sector of ITU, Annex C RTP Payload Format H, 261, 108
- trust — Definition of trust in English by Oxford Dictionaries
- 2019, IEEE 2410-2015 - IEEE Standard for Biometric Open Protocol
- J. McWaters, 2016, A Blueprint for Digital Identity
- Certinomis: Certificate for test.Com
- C. Allen, 2016, The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity. Life with Alacrity
- A. Preukschat, 2021, Self-Sovereign Identity: Decentralized Digital Identity and Verifiable Credential
- R. Eliezerov, 2018, The Digital Identity Crisis. How the Explosion of Personal Information Is Transforming Technology
- AngelovA.MilkovM.SørensenM.Decentralized Identity Management System for Self-Sovereign Identity2018Alborg, DenmarkAlborg UniversityMaster Thesis
- U. W. Chohan, 2017, The decentralized autonomous organization and governance issues, SSRN Electronic Journal
- S. Seibold, 2016, Consensus, immutable agreement for the internet of value
- D. Reed, 2016, The Technical Foundations of Sovrin, A White Paper from the Sovrin Foundation
- Sovrin Board of Trustees, 2017, Sovrin provisional trust framework
- T. Koen, 2017, Efficient ZeroKnowledge Range Proofs in Ethereum
- M. Ali, 2017, Blockstack: a new internet for decentralized applications, Whitepaper
- 2021, IIW - internet identity workshop
- E. U Regulation (, 2014, No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
- 2020, Deloitte Digital - Blockchain Proof-Of-Concept to Mutualize KYC Checks — Deloitte Luxembourg — Press Release
- 2021, Cambridge blockchain — identity solutions
Cited by
Items 101–127 of 127
“Soltani et al. [1] analyze the SSI ecosystem and show how decentralized identifiers (DIDs) and VCs ensure user-centric, privacy-preserving identity management.”
What is digital identity? A transdisciplinary meta-synthesis
Johansen, J., Hinds, J. M., Hajszan, P., Joinson, A., & Hamilton-Giachritsis, C. E. (2026) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2026.103901
dos Santos, Y. D. R., de Oliveira, N. R., Barbosa, G. N. N., et al. (2025) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-6568987/v1
Ikegawa, K., 佐藤, 竜., & Hoshikawa, N. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3721544
“Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), credential schemas, and definitions are recorded on a Verifiable Data Registry (VDR). a custodial model [2] in which the provider manages the Holder’s keys and wallet on the user’s behalf, alongside the noncustodial model [3].”
Blockchain and Attribute-Based Encryption for Cross-Organizational IIoT
Costa, W. N. F., da Conceição, A. F., & Rocha, V. E. M. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Industry Applications · doi:10.1109/induscon66435.2025.11241288
“Issuing organizations (e.g., manufacturers) will emit Verifiable Credentials (VCs) containing specific attributes (e.g., company:ABC, class:temperature, location:sectorX) [32].”
Threat analysis for self-sovereign identity project: a case study
Butakov, S., & Smolin, D. (2026) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2026.04.020
Chadha, R., Mahajan, P., Gupta, R., & Khullar, S. (2026) · International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Automation for Sustainable Solutions (ICASS) · doi:10.1109/icass69550.2026.11547640
Veronika Yuni, T., & Soderi, A. (2025) · Digitus Journal of Computer Science Applications · doi:10.61978/digitus.v3i3.955 · Cited by 1
Rao, R. K., & Narang, P. K. (2022) · Advances in healthcare information systems and administration book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-8966-3.ch007
Kim, N.-R., Kim, S.-Y., Im, N., Park, S., & Lee, I.-G. (2026) · ICT Express · doi:10.1016/j.icte.2026.09.014
Byers, B. S., Eeva, V., Hall, D., & Wolf, C. D. (2025) · ASCE International Conference on Computing in Civil Engineering (i3CE) · doi:10.1061/9780784486139.040
Al‐Sabahi, K., & Mabsali, Y. K. A. (2026) · Frontiers in Blockchain · doi:10.3389/fbloc.2025.1730645 · Cited by 2
Formalizing a Routing Layer for Cross-Blockchain Communication
Rometsch, L., Kobelt, M., Sober, M., & Schulte, S. (2026) · Distributed Ledger Technologies Research and Practice · doi:10.1145/3849491
A Review of Attribute-Based Credentials for Secure and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management
Lei, J., Wang, L., Zhang, Y., Sun, G., Liu, Y., & Du, C. (2026) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics15173869
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT, SSI AND BLOCKCHAIN: A REVIEW
Gujar, V. (2023) · International Journal of Engineering Applied Sciences and Technology · doi:10.33564/ijeast.2023.v08i07.007 · Cited by 1
“The idea behind self-sovereign identity is the ability for the identity holders (e. g., users) to have better control over their identity data, with strong emphasis on data portability and data minimization [19].”
BackgroundA Novel Key Management Framework for Secure and Scalable Decentralized Identity Systems
Yıldız, M., & Bahtıyar, Ş. (2024) · International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN) · doi:10.1109/sin63213.2024.10871880 · Cited by 2
“In particular, there are critical key management challenges in ensuring the security and scalability of cryptographic key generation, storage and recovery [2].”
(2023) · doi:10.5753/cblockchain.2023.230032
“Triângulo da confiança de SSI informações pessoais do proprietário [Soltani et al. 2021].”
“By binding the QR code issuance to verifiable credentials or signed DID documents, users could log in using portable digital identities validated by third parties or organizations [21].”
“This leads to consent fatigue, where users experience repetitive and hard-to-read prompts, skim or ignore critical information [4].”
TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES OF DECENTRALIZED IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Ermolaev, K. A., & Yormatov, S. E. (2022) · Chronos · doi:10.52013/2658-7556-66-4-37
Feed4Cloud: Towards trustworthy QoE-aware cloud service monitoring using blockchain
Kapetanidou, I. A., Sarros, C.-A., Ledakis, G., & Tsaoussidis, V. (2024) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2024.107532
Metadata
- Authors
- Soltani, R., Nguyen, U. T., & An, A.
- Affiliations
- York University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Soltani, Reza
- Venue
- Security and Communication Networks
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-07-17
- Volume
- 2021
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 1939-0114 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0122
- OpenAlex
- W3184916135
- Cited by
- 131
- References
- 127
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 16.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Security and Communication Networks (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Keywords
- self-sovereign identity, digital identity, identity management, decentralized identifiers, verifiable credentials, distributed ledger technology, privacy engineering, identity regulation, identity ecosystem
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A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-12, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.