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Cited by 301

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes

Broz, J. Lawrence·2002·International Organization
DOI 10.1162/002081802760403801
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Abstract

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary commitments that differ in transparency. While CBI is opaque and difficult to monitor, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is easily observed. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of monetary commitments and the transparency of political systems are substitutes. Where political decision making is opaque (autocracies), governments must look to a commitment that is more transparent and constrained (fixed exchange rates) than the government itself. The transparency of the monetary commitment substitutes for the transparency of the political system to engender low inflation. Where the political process is transparent (democracies), a formal commitment to CBI can produce lower inflation because private agents and the political opposition are free to detect and punish government interference with the central bank. Statistical results indicate that (1) autocracies are more likely to adopt exchange-rate pegs than democracies, and (2) CBI is effective in limiting inflation in nations with high levels of political transparency.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 61 references

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. Debelle, 1994, Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, 195
  2. 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00821.x · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00821.x
  3. 1997, World Development Indicators
  4. Bruno, 1988, Inflation Stabilization: The Experience of Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Mexico
  5. Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
  6. 10.2307/1992126 · doi:10.2307/1992126
  7. 10.3386/w7228 · doi:10.3386/w7228
  8. Edison, 1990, Monetary Policy for a Volatile Global Economy, 1
  9. 10.1162/003355399555990 · doi:10.1162/003355399555990
  10. Bordo, 1997, Why Clashes Between Internal and External Stability Goals End in Currency Crises, 1797–1994
  11. 1998, International Financial Statistics
  12. Cottarelli, 1998, Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund, 10.5089/9781451969337.003 · doi:10.5089/9781451969337.003
  13. Fischer, 1994, The Future of Central Banking, 262
  14. 10.3386/w5756 · doi:10.3386/w5756
  15. Shepsle, 1978, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Broz, J. L.
Venue
International Organization
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2002
Volume
56
Issue
4
Pages
861-887
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
DOI
10.1162/002081802760403801
OpenAlex
W2126056404
Cited by
301
References
61
FWCI
21.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 554 d)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/002081802760403801
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Broz, J. L. (2002). Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403801

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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