The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*
Abstract
Monetary rules matter for the equilibrium rate of employment when the number of price-wage setters is small, even when assuming rational expectations, complete information, central bank precommitment, and absence of nominal rigidities. If the central bank is nonaccommodating, sufficiently large unions, bargaining independently, have an incentive to moderate sectoral money wages, and thereby expected real wages. The result is an increase in the real money supply, and hence higher demand and employment. This does not hold with accommodating monetary policy since unions' wage decisions cannot then affect the real money supply. A similar argument holds for large monopolistically competitive price setters.
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Citations
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Cited by
An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
(2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0001 · Cited by 3,083
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Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State
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Self-citationHall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. (2009) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123409000672 · Cited by 1,113
Metadata
- Authors
- Soskice, D., & Iversen, T.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 265-284
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2097733424
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 76.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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