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Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews*
Abstract
Israeli Ultra-Orthodox men study full-time in yeshiva until age 40 on average. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after exemption. Fertility rates are high (TFR = 7.6) and rising. A social interaction approach explains these anomalies. Yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community, which provides mutual insurance to members. Prohibitions strengthen communities by effectively taxing real wages, inducing high fertility. Historically, the incursion of markets into traditional communities produces Ultra-Orthodoxy. Subsidies induce dramatic reductions in labor supply and unparalleled increases in fertility, illustrating extreme responses social groups may have to interventions.
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Cites
Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance
Azzi, C., & Ehrenberg, R. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260305 · Cited by 711
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
Camerer, C. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228946 · Cited by 372
Cited by
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Participation in Heterogeneous Communities*
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554935 · Cited by 1,864
Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior
Sosis, R., & Alcorta, C. (2003) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.10120 · Cited by 699
Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003) · Cross-Cultural Research · doi:10.1177/1069397103037002003 · Cited by 569
Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model
Berman, E., & Laitin, D. D. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.03.007 · Cited by 474
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Metadata
- Authors
- Berman, E.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-08
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 905-953
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3125002366
- Cited by
- 541
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 34.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Berman, E. (2000). Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews*. Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554944
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