Cited by 1,183Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEconomic Theory and Institutions

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 13 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?

Open access
List, J. A.·2003·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

This study examines individual behavior in two well-functioning marketplaces to investigate whether market experience eliminates the endowment effect. Field evidence from both markets suggests that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as market experience increases. In an experimental test of whether these observations are due to treatment (market experience) or selection (e.g., static preferences), I find that market experience plays a significant role in eliminating the endowment effect. I also find that these results are robust to institutional change and extend beyond the two marketplaces studied. Overall, this study provides strong evidence that market experience eliminates an important market anomaly.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Using field experiments in sportscard, pin, auction, and lab markets, List finds a pooled endowment effect but shows trading rates converge toward the neoclassical prediction as market experience increases. Panel and selection analyses suggest market experience attenuates the endowment effect rather than merely reflecting static selection.

Key findings

  • In the Orlando sportscard show, pooled trading was 32.8% (23/70) and 34.6% (27/78), Fisher p < .001; dealers traded at 45.7% and 43.6% (p = .194), while nondealers traded at 20.0% and 25.6% (p < .001). Experienced nondealers traded at 46.7% (p = .32), versus 6.8% for inexperienced nondealers (p < .001).
  • In the Epcot pin market, pooled trading was 25.0% and 32.5% (p < .001); experienced consumers (≥7 monthly trades) traded at 40.0% (p = .26), while inexperienced consumers traded at 25.0% (p < .001). Using a ≥5-trade cutoff, experienced consumers traded at 46.7% (p = .30) and inexperienced at 18.0% (p < .001).
  • In the follow-up sportscard experiment (n = 53 nondealers), pooled trading was 40.0% and 35.7% (p < .08); experienced consumers traded at 45.5% and 60.0% (p = .99), while inexperienced consumers traded at 35.7% and 22.2% (p < .02). Chamberlain panel models controlling for individual heterogeneity found trading experience significantly related to trade probability, and bivariate probit selection estimates suggested little evidence that selection bias was a major problem.
  • In the Tucson auction, dealers’ mean WTA ($8.15) was about 1.30 times mean WTP ($6.27), not statistically different (t = 0.87); nondealers’ mean WTA ($18.53) was about 5.6 times mean WTP ($3.32), statistically different (t = 4.13). In the lab, initial trading was 11.4% (4/35) and 12% (4/33), rising later to 27% (9/33) and 25.7% (9/35), with Fisher p < .05 and p < .06.

Methods

  • Four field experiments used random allocation trading designs with unique goods: Orlando sportscard show (148 subjects: 74 dealers, 74 nondealers), Epcot pin market (80 consumers), follow-up Orlando sportscard show (53 nondealers; 19 dealers also reported), and Tucson sportscard auction (120 decisions: 30 WTA and 30 WTP each for dealers and nondealers). A lab ABCD/DCBA design was run over two four-week periods at the University of Arizona.
  • Main analyses included Fisher’s exact tests, logit/probit trade models, Chamberlain panel logit models with individual fixed effects, bivariate probit sample-selection models, and large-sample t-tests for auction WTA/WTP comparisons.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the follow-up experiment could suffer sample-selection bias, though bivariate probit estimates suggest little evidence it is a major problem. It also states the auction WTA/WTP comparison is rough because it compares value statements along different indifference curves, discards two nondealer WTA outliers ($1000 and $500), and notes the point estimates do not fully support neoclassical theory.
  • The paper states that the gender/endowment-effect relationship needs future research before firm conclusions.
  • Evident from the text: the field designs rely on natural variation in experience and endogenous selection into trading, some subsamples are small (e.g., 20 experienced pin consumers, 21 experienced follow-up consumers), and the lab still finds a significant endowment effect after four rounds, indicating learning is slow.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/00335530360535144

Cites

26 of 26 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

37 Own result · 20 Own interpretation · 10 Not checked yet · 10 Own method · 7 No basis given

Verify all 13 references — free account

Show all 38 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 35
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 15
46 of 46
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The number of trades made in a typical month is a valid measure of market experience.

    “Trading experience represents the number of trades made in a typical month.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The sportscard and pin marketplaces studied are well-functioning marketplaces.

    “This study examines individual behavior in two well-functioning marketplaces to investigate whether market experience eliminates the endowment effect.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Subjects' stated plans to consume the memorabilia indicate that they will not resell or trade the good immediately after the experiment.

    “During the exit interview, more than 95 percent (142 of 148) of the subjects stated that they planned to consume the piece of memorabilia”
    “an exit interview revealed that a large majority of subjects (52 of 53) planned to keep the unique Negro League piece of memorabilia.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    In the simulation, there are two types of equally numbered consumers, type A and type B.

    “pure exchange economy with two types of equally numbered consumers populating the economy: type A and type B.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Within both consumer types, a proportion F of consumers is unsophisticated/inexperienced, and the remaining consumers are sophisticated/experienced.

    “Within both consumer types, a proportion F of consumers is unsophisticated, or inexperienced, while the remaining consumers are sophisticated, or experienced.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Inexperienced consumers have downward inertial consumption of one of the goods (an extreme endowment effect), while experienced consumers have no such characteristic inherent in their preference structure.

    “The inexperienced consumers have downward inertial consumption of one of the goods (e.g., an extreme case of an endowment effect), while the experienced consumers have no such characteristic inherent in their preference structure, perhaps due to learning.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    All consumers maximize Cobb-Douglas utility functions of the form U = G1^φ G2^(1-φ).

    “Further assume that all consumers maximize Cobb-Douglas utility functions of the form: U 5 G 1 f j G 2 1 2f j , where j denotes consumer type.”
7 of 7

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2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 25 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Akerlof George A, 1985, American Economic Review, 720
  2. Coursey Don, 1987, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 690
  3. Knetsch Jack L, 1989, American Economic Review, 1277
  4. List John A, 2001, American Economic Review, 1507
  5. List John A, 1998, American Economic Review, 1355
  6. Thaler Richard, 1980, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60
  7. Tversky Amos, 1991, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1061
  8. van de Ven Wynand, 1981, Journal of Econometrics, 252

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Metadata

Authors
List, J. A.
Affiliations
University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Corresponding author
List, J. A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2003-02-01
Volume
118
Issue
1
Pages
41-71
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2030360026
Cited by
1,183
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 72 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 52 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 56 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 65 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 68
FWCI
104.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
market experience, endowment effect, market anomalies, individual behavior, institutional change, marketplaces, behavioral economics

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