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Cited by 878Academic integrity and plagiarismBenford’s Law and Fraud DetectionEducational Assessment and Improvement

Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating

Jacob, B. A., Levitt, S. D.·2003·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/00335530360698441
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Abstract

We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago public schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4–5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. The observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.

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Crossref · 10.1162/00335530360698441

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 22

  1. 10.1007/BF00974740 · DOI
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  3. Baker George, 1992, Journal of Political Economy, 614
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  5. Carnoy, Martin, and Susanna Loeb, "Does External Accountability Affect Student Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis," Working Paper, Stanford University School of Education, 2002. · DOI
  6. Contreras, Russell, "Inquiry Uncovers Possible Cheating on GRE in Asia," Associated Press August 7, 2002.
  7. DiTella, Rafael, and Ernesto Schargrodsky, "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," unpublished manuscript, Harvard Business School, 2001. · DOI
  8. Duggan Mark, 2002, American Economic Review, 1605
  9. Figlio, David N., and Joshua Winicki, "Food for Thought: The Effects of School Accountability Plans on School Nutrition," Working Paper, University of Florida, 2001. · DOI
  10. Figlio, David N., and Lawrence S. Getzler, "Accountability, Ability and Disability: Gaming the System?" Working Paper University of Florida, 2002. · DOI
  11. Fisman Ray, 2001, American Economic Review, 1095, 10.1257/aer.91.4.1095 · DOI
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  15. Hanushek, Eric A., and Margaret E. Raymond, "Improving Educational Quality: How Best to Evaluate Our Schools?" Conference paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2002.
  16. Holland, Paul W. "Assessing Unusual Agreement between the Incorrect Answers of Two Examinees Using the K-Index: Statistical Theory and Empirical Support," Technical Report No. 96-5, Educational Testing Service, 1996. · DOI
  17. Holmstrom Bengt, 1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 51
  18. Klein, Stephen P., Laura S. Hamilton, et al. "What Do Test Scores in Texas Tell Us?" RAND Corporation, 2000. · DOI
  19. Lindsay Drew, 1996, Education Week (, 25
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  22. Wollack James A, 1997, Applied Psychological Measurement, 152

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Authors
Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • American Bar Foundation (US)
ORCID
Jacob, B. A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2003-08-01
Volume
118
Issue
3
Pages
843-877
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/00335530360698441
OpenAlex
W3123468586
Cited by
878
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 40 · 2015: 52 · 2014: 52 · 2013: 66 · 2012: 62
FWCI
65.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Education › Academic integrity and plagiarism
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Benford’s Law and Fraud Detection
  • Social Sciences › Education › Educational Assessment and Improvement
Keywords
standardized testing, incentive mechanisms, bright-line rules, high-powered incentives, behavioral distortions, Chicago Public Schools, elementary school

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