The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity
Abstract
Analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments, we find that transactions vary with nations' legal enforcement, whether measured directly or through legal origin. Investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants. In low enforcement and civil law nations, private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt, and rely on equity and board control. Transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns. While relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems, these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy.
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Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Law and FinancePreprint
Porta, R. L., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1996) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 2,957
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297860 · Cited by 2,128
Legal Determinants of External Finance
Porta, R. L., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329518 · Cited by 2,031
Kaplan, S., & Stromberg, P. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7660 · Cited by 1,180
Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans
QIAN, J., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01293.x · Cited by 1,102
Debt Enforcement around the World
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/595015 · Cited by 929
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13608 · Cited by 892
The Importance of History for Economic Development
Nunn, N. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143336 · Cited by 698
Metadata
- Authors
- Lerner, J., & Schoar, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-02-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 223-246
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2169961554
- Cited by
- 498
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 119.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.