Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent financial crises.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework
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Chapter 21 The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework
(1999) · Handbook of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0048(99)10034-x · Cited by 3,539
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.77 · Cited by 3,322
What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say About the Transmission of Monetary Policy?
Kashyap, A. K., & Stein, J. C. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.3.407 · Cited by 2,495
A model of unconventional monetary policy
Gertler, M., & Karadi, P. (2011) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.10.004 · Cited by 2,393
Metadata
- Authors
- Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-08-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 663-691
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2047582865
- Cited by
- 3,889
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 48.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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