The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard
Abstract
We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexist with capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources. An incentive problem exists between the firm’s insiders and outside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only credit but also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannot precommit to a particular level of monitoring, there is a unique credit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combination of bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, a marginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financing would raise the firm’s stock price.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
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Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
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Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
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Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups
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Cited by
Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor
RAJAN, R., & WINTON, A. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x · Cited by 1,193
Bolton, P., & Freixas, X. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262121 · Cited by 677
Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp089 · Cited by 615
Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
THAKOR, A. V. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x · Cited by 586
Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?
Blum, J. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00113-7 · Cited by 549
Metadata
- Authors
- Besanko, D., & Kanatas, G.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 213-232
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2063333733
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 4.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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