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Cited by 313

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard

Besanko, David, Kanatas, George·1993·Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexist with capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources. An incentive problem exists between the firm’s insiders and outside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only credit but also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannot precommit to a particular level of monitoring, there is a unique credit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combination of bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, a marginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financing would raise the firm’s stock price.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/6.1.213

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Metadata

Authors
Besanko, D., & Kanatas, G.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
1993-01
Volume
6
Issue
1
Pages
213-232
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W2063333733
Cited by
313
References
19
FWCI
4.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/6.1.213
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Besanko, D., & Kanatas, G. (1993). Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/6.1.213

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.