The Cognitive Domain of a Glider in the Game of Life
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article examines in some technical detail the application of Maturana and Varela's biology of cognition to a simple concrete model: a glider in the game of Life cellular automaton. By adopting an autopoietic perspective on a glider, the set of possible perturbations to it can be divided into destructive and nondestructive subsets. From a glider's reaction to each nondestructive perturbation, its cognitive domain is then mapped. In addition, the structure of a glider's possible knowledge of its immediate environment, and the way in which that knowledge is grounded in its constitution, are fully described. The notion of structural coupling is then explored by characterizing the paths of mutual perturbation that a glider and its environment can undergo. Finally, a simple example of a communicative interaction between two gliders is given. The article concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of this analysis for the enactive approach to cognition.
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Citations
Cites
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001 · Cited by 2,449
Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/0303-2647(74)90031-8 · Cited by 1,899
Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y · Cited by 806
Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind
Froese, T., & Ziemke, T. (2009) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2008.12.001 · Cited by 317
Structural Coupling and the Origin of Meaning in a Simple Cellular Automation
Varela, F. J. (1988) · The Semiotics of Cellular Communication in the Immune System · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-73145-7_13 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“More generally, how might the key ideas of the enactive approach to cognition manifest themselves in this simple model? At its core, enaction is about a self-sustaining entity bringing forth, through its history of structural coupling with its environment, a world of significance and a valueladen point of view on that…”
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Cited by
Levin, M. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02688 · Cited by 297
Levin, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.768201 · Cited by 195
“…plate of neurons can learn to fly a flight simulator, and it lives in a new virtual world (DeMarse and Dockendorf, 2005; Manicka and Harvey, 2008; Beer, 2014), as seen from the development of closed-loop neurobiological platforms (Demarse et al., 2001; Potter et al., 2005; Bakkum et al.,…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFields, C., & Levin, M. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24060819 · Cited by 121
On markov blankets and hierarchical self-organisation
Palacios, E. R., Razi, A., Parr, T., Kirchhoff, M., & Friston, K. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110089 · Cited by 115
Individuality, subjectivity, and minimal cognition
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-016-9543-1 · Cited by 76
Metadata
- Authors
- Beer, R. D.
- Venue
- Artificial Life
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2014-04
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 183-206
- ISSN
- 1064-5462 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9185
- OpenAlex
- W2151525702
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 6.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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