The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass
Abstract
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small manufacturing firms
Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118465 · Cited by 2,547
Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy?Evidence from Panel Data
Winkelmann, L., & Winkelmann, R. (1998) · Economica · doi:10.1111/1468-0335.00111 · Cited by 1,725
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
Azariadis, C. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260388 · Cited by 1,262
Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand
Baily, M. N. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296397 · Cited by 893
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Pauly, M. V. (1974) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881793 · Cited by 707
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262078 · Cited by 588
Efficient Unemployment Insurance
Acemoğlu, D., & Shimer, R. J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250084 · Cited by 441
Productivity gains from unemployment insurance
Acemoglu, D., & Shimer, R. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00035-0 · Cited by 378
Labor-Market Policies in an Equilibrium Search Model
Alvarez, F. E., & Veracierto, M. (1999) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.2307/3585315 · Cited by 33
Cited by
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchard, O. J., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 45-77
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W3021805523
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 51.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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