The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System
Open accessAbstract
The public Indian health care system is plagued by high staff absence, low effort by providers, and limited use by potential beneficiaries who prefer private alternatives. This artice reports the results of an experiment carried out with a district administration and a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The presence of government nurses in government public health facilities (subcenters and aid-posts) was recorded by the NGO, and the government took steps to punish the worst delinquents. Initially, the monitoring system was extremely effective. This shows that nurses are responsive to financial incentives. But after a few months, the local health administration appears to have undermined the scheme from the inside by letting the nurses claim an increasing number of "exempt days." Eighteen months after its inception, the program had become completely ineffective.
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“This type of interventions starts from the assumption that monitoring or punishments are easily bypassed (Banerjee et al., 2007), while a structural change in the organization, culture, and rules of specific services can reduce the “market”, “need” and “justification” for corruption (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015).”
BackgroundThe Impact of Nutritional Interventions on Child Health and Cognitive Development
Bommer, C., Mittal, N., & Vollmer, S. (2020) · Annual Review of Resource Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-110519-093256 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Banerjee, A. V., Duflo, E., & Glennerster, R.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-04
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 487-500
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W1978479335
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 15.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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