Homeostatic Feelings and the Emergence of Consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article, we summarize our views on the problem of consciousness and outline the current version of a novel hypothesis for how conscious minds can be generated in mammalian organisms. We propose that a mind can be considered conscious when three processes are in place: the first is a continuous generation of interoceptive feelings, which results in experiencing of the organism's internal operations; the second is the equally continuous production of images, generated according to the organism's sensory perspective relative to its surround; the third combines feeling/experience and perspective resulting in a process of subjectivity relative to the image contents. We also propose a biological basis for these three components: the peripheral and central physiology of interoception and exteroception help explain the implementation of the first two components, whereas the third depends on central nervous system integration, at multiple levels, from spinal cord, brainstem, and diencephalic nuclei, to selected regions of the mesial cerebral cortices.
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“The feeling process, as we see it, is the consequence of a partnership between a sector of the nervous system—the interoceptive sector—and the non-verbal interior of the organism responsible for the life process”
From Sensing, feeling and consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [5]
Citations
Cites
How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body
Craig, A. D. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn894 · Cited by 6,006 · cited 1×
“The interaction is made possible by the close and unusual relationships that the interoceptive nervous system maintains with the visceral interior (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Craig, 2002).”
BackgroundIntegrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
(1990) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 1,661
The nature of feelings: evolutionary and neurobiological origins
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3403 · Cited by 1,280 · cited 2×
“The interaction is made possible by the close and unusual relationships that the interoceptive nervous system maintains with the visceral interior (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Craig, 2002).”
BackgroundConscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Cited by 1,164
20 years of the default mode network: A review and synthesis.
Menon, V. (2023) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2023.04.023 · Cited by 934 · cited 1×
“…include the posteromedial cingulate cortex and the retrosplenial cortex, regions that belong to the so-called “ default mode network, ” a set of cortical and subcortical regions associated with the sort of internal narrative processing commonly found in complex subjective experiences (Menon, 2023).”
BackgroundConsciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868 · cited 1×
“Of special interest, in this regard, is the fact that children born with extensive bilateral damage to the cerebral cortex have homeostatic feelings and manifest consciousness (Merker, 2007).”
BackgroundConsciousness and the brainstem
Parvizi, J. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00127-x · Cited by 503
Neuroanatomical correlates of brainstem coma
Parvizi, J. (2003) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awg166 · Cited by 400 · cited 1×
“On the other hand, damage to upper and posterior brain stem nuclei, such as periaque-ductal gray area, parabrachial nucleus, and nucleus tractus solitarius, do abolish feelings and consciousness (Parvizi & Damasio, 2001, 2003).”
BackgroundPersistence of feelings and sentience after bilateral damage of the insula
Damasio, A., Damasio, H., & Tranel, D. (2013) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs077 · Cited by 282 · cited 2×
“For example, we know that damage to the upper and posterior brain stem predictably impairs consciousness; on the other hand, bilateral insular destruction does not preclude homeostatic feelings and does not impair consciousness (Damasio et al., 2013).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Lieberman, 1976, Sensory ganglia, 188
- Tsakiris, 2020, The interoceptive mind: From homeostasis to awareness, 10.1093/oso/9780198811930.003.0003 · DOI
Cited by
A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
Sensing, feeling and consciousness
Damasio, A., & Damasio, H. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0243 · Cited by 17
Self-citationThe physiology of interoception and its adaptive role in consciousness
Singer, J., & Damásio, A. R. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0305 · Cited by 21
Self-citationHow to be an integrated information theorist without losing your body
Cea, I., & Signorelli, C. M. (2025) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2024.1510066 · Cited by 12
Feeding, Emotion, and the Brain Stem: The Interesting Case of the Mesencephalic Trigeminal Nucleus
Turnbull, O. H. (2025) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci16010061 · Cited by 3
“Here we have structures which form in utero [53–55] and progressively link medullary nuclei (that underpin homeostasis) with midbrain and pontine nuclei (that mediate consciousness and other aspects of the mind) [9,10,52].”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Damasio, A., & Damasio, H.
- Affiliations
- University of Southern California
- Venue
- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1653-1659
- ISSN
- 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
- 1530-8898
- OpenAlex
- W4391577435
- Semantic Scholar
- 351c632456c9706e2bf51317a22ba0f895dfd833
- Cited by
- 26
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6
- FWCI
- 10.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- BCI Research Group on Human Consciousness
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- consciousness, interoception, exteroception, subjectivity, images, central nervous system integration, diencephalon, brainstem, spinal cord, emergence of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Brain, Consciousness, Emotions, Homeostasis, Humans, Interoception
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.