Cited by 503Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionNeural dynamics and brain function

Consciousness and the brainstem

Parvizi, J·2001·Cognition

Abstract

In the first part of this article we summarize a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses aimed at accounting for consciousness in neurobiological terms. The basic form of consciousness, core consciousness is placed in the context of life regulation; it is seen as yet another level of biological processing aimed at ensuring the homeostatic balance of a living organism; and the representation of the current organism state within somato-sensing structures is seen as critical to its development. Core consciousness is conceived as the imaged relationship of the interaction between an object and the changed organism state it causes. In the second part of the article we discuss the functional neuroanatomy of nuclei in the brainstem reticular formation because they constitute the basic set of somato-sensing structures necessary for core consciousness and its core self to emerge. The close relationship between the mechanisms underlying cortical activation and the bioregulatory mechanisms outlined here is entirely compatible with the classical idea that the reticular formation modulates the electrophysiological activity of the cerebral cortex. However, in the perspective presented here, that modulation is placed in the setting of the organism's homeostatic regulation.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00127-x

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  • Arguments for the subcortical basis of subjective experience in humans provide important convergent evidence for the role of a PI in subjective experience.

    “arguments for the subcortical basis of subjective experience in humans [16,40–43] provide important convergent evidence for the role of a PI in subjective experience [9,16].”

    From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [40]

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Authors
Parvizi, J.
Affiliations
University of Iowa (US)
Corresponding author
Parvizi, J
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2001-04
Volume
79
Issue
1-2
Pages
135-160
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2140088257
Cited by
503
References
145
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 15
FWCI
10.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
Keywords
consciousness, brainstem reticular formation, homeostatic regulation, self, cortical activation, bioregulation
MeSH terms
Brain Stem, Cerebral Cortex, Consciousness, Humans, Reticular Formation

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