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Cited by 60Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionCognitive Science and Education Research

Feelings Are the Source of Consciousness

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Damasio, Antonio, Damasio, Hanna·2023·Neural Computation
DOI 10.1162/neco_a_01521
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Abstract

In this view, we address the problem of consciousness, and although we focus on its human presentation, we note that the phenomenon is present in numerous nonhuman species and use findings from a variety of animal studies to explain our hypothesis for how consciousness is made. Consciousness occurs when mind contents, such as perceptions and thoughts, are spontaneously identified as belonging to a specific organism/owner. Conscious minds are said to have a self that experiences mental events. We hypothesize that the automatic identification that associates minds and organisms is provided by a continuous flow of homeostatic feelings. Those feelings arise from the uninterrupted process of life regulation and correspond to both salient physiological fluctuations such as hunger, pain, well-being, or malaise, as well as to states closer to metabolic equilibrium and best described as feelings of life/existence, such as breathing or body temperature. We also hypothesize that homeostatic feelings were the inaugural phenomena of consciousness in biological evolution and venture that they were selected because the information they provided regarding the current state of life regulation conferred extraordinary advantages to the organisms so endowed. The “knowledge” carried by conscious homeostatic feelings provided “overt” guidance for life regulation, an advance over the covert regulation present in nonconscious organisms. Finally, we outline a mechanism for the generation of feelings based on a two-way interaction between interoceptive components of the nervous system and a particular set of nonneural components of the organism's interior, namely, viscera and circulating chemical molecules involved in their operations. Feelings emerge from this interaction as continuous and hybrid phenomena, related simultaneously to two series of events. The first is best described by the terms neural/representational/and mental and the second by the terms nonneural/visceral/and chemical. We note that this account offers a solution for the mind-body problem: homeostatic feelings constitute the “mental” version of bodily processes.

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  • The feeling process is the consequence of a partnership between the interoceptive sector of the nervous system and the non-verbal interior of the organism responsible for the life process.

    “The feeling process, as we see it, is the consequence of a partnership between a sector of the nervous system—the interoceptive sector—and the non-verbal interior of the organism responsible for the life process”

    From Sensing, feeling and consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [4]

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Baars, B. J. (1988). Acognitive theory of consciousness . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Lieberman, A. (1976). Sensory ganglia. In D. N. London (Ed.), The peripheral nerve (pp. 188-278). London: Chapman and Hall.
  3. Parvizi, J., & Damasio, A. (2003). Neurocorrelates of brainstem coma. Brain , 126 (7), 1524-1536. 10 . 1093/brain/awg166, PubMed: 12805123
  4. Solms, M., & Friston, K. J. (2018). How and why consciousness arises. Journal of Consciousness Studies , 25 , 1-33.
  5. Tsakiris, M., & de Preester, H. (2020). The interoceptive mind: From homeostasis to awareness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Authors
Damasio, A., & Damasio, H.
Affiliations
  • Brain and Creativity Institute, Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-2921, U.S.A. damasio@usc.edu
  • Brain and Creativity Institute, Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-2921, U.S.A. hdamasio@usc.edu
Venue
Neural Computation
Publisher
MIT Press
Published
2023-02-17
Volume
35
Issue
3
Pages
277-286
ISSN
  • 0899-7667 (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-888X
DOI
10.1162/neco_a_01521
OpenAlex
W4288069465
Semantic Scholar
e148390cc857bc643a4b86ee357d4e13b00e61ae
Cited by
60
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 2
FWCI
10.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neural Computation (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
consciousness, feelings, self, mind-body problem, homeostasis, interoception, evolution of consciousness, animal consciousness, non-human species
MeSH terms
Animals, Consciousness, Biological Evolution, Humans

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