Whence the Expected Free Energy?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The expected free energy (EFE) is a central quantity in the theory of active inference. It is the quantity that all active inference agents are mandated to minimize through action, and its decomposition into extrinsic and intrinsic value terms is key to the balance of exploration and exploitation that active inference agents evince. Despite its importance, the mathematical origins of this quantity and its relation to the variational free energy (VFE) remain unclear. In this letter, we investigate the origins of the EFE in detail and show that it is not simply ”the free energy in the future.” We present a functional that we argue is the natural extension of the VFE but actively discourages exploratory behavior, thus demonstrating that exploration does not directly follow from free energy minimization into the future. We then develop a novel objective, the free energy of the expected future (FEEF), which possesses both the epistemic component of the EFE and an intuitive mathematical grounding as the divergence between predicted and desired futures.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 10×
“The free-energy principle (FEP) (Friston, 2010; Friston & Ao, 2012; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006) is an emerging theory from theoretical neuroscience that offers a unifying explanation of the dynamics of self-organizing systems (Friston, 2019; Parr, Da Costa, & Friston, 2020).”
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“…(K. Friston, 2003, 2005, 2008; K. J. Friston, 2008; K. J. Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, & Daunizeau, 2008), extending the Bayesian Brain hypothesis (Deneve, 2005; Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007; Knill & Pouget, 2004) by postulating that the neural dynamics of the brain perform variational inference.”
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
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“Under certain assumptions about the forms of the densities embodied by the agent, this theory can even be translated down to the level of neural circuits in the form of a biologically plausible neuronal process theory (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2008a; Kanai, Komura, Shipp, & Friston, 2015; Shipp, 2016; Spratling,…”
BackgroundCuriosity-Driven Exploration by Self-Supervised Prediction
Pathak, D., Agrawal, P., Efros, A. A., & Darrell, T. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW) · doi:10.1109/cvprw.2017.70 · Cited by 1,815
A free energy principle for the brain
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Bayesian surprise attracts human attention
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Active inference: a process theory
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Hierarchical Models in the Brain
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“The generalized coordinates mean that the agent is effectively performing variational inference over a Taylor-expanded future trajectory instead of a temporally instant hidden state (Friston, 2008a; Friston et al., 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhat is intrinsic motivation? A typology of computational approaches
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Active inference and epistemic value
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Cited by
A step-by-step tutorial on active inference and its application to empirical data
Smith, R., Friston, K. J., & Whyte, C. J. (2022) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102632 · Cited by 246
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
(2021) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 141
Interoception as modeling, allostasis as control
Sennesh, E., Theriault, J., Brooks, D., van de Meent, J.-W., Barrett, L. F., & Quigley, K. S. (2022) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108242 · Cited by 107
The empirical status of predictive coding and active inference
Hodson, R., Mehta, M., & Smith, R. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105473 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- Millidge, B., Tschantz, A., & Buckley, C. L.
- Venue
- Neural Computation
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2021-02-01
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 447-482
- ISSN
- 0899-7667 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-888X
- OpenAlex
- W3017237277
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 6.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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