The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference
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Abstract
This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference—and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models. Crucially, these models can entertain both discrete and continuous states, leading to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to elucidate the requisite message passing in terms of its form and scheduling. To accommodate mixed generative models (of discrete and continuous states), one also has to consider link nodes or factors that enable discrete and continuous representations to talk to each other. When mapping the implicit computational architecture onto neuronal connectivity, several interesting features emerge. For example, Bayesian model averaging and comparison, which link discrete and continuous states, may be implemented in thalamocortical loops. These and other considerations speak to a computational connectome that is inherently state dependent and self-organizing in ways that yield to a principled (variational) account. We conclude with simulations of reading that illustrate the implicit neuronal message passing, with a special focus on how discrete (semantic) representations inform, and are informed by, continuous (visual) sampling of the sensorium.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper derives belief propagation under deep generative models as a computational architecture for functional integration in the brain, using Forney factor graphs to link discrete and continuous state representations. It maps the resulting message passing onto intrinsic/extrinsic cortical microcircuits and cortico–basal ganglia–thalamic loops, illustrating the scheme with simulations of pictographic reading.
Key findings
- Belief propagation under deep generative models can be expressed with Forney factor graphs; discrete models use A/B/C/D matrices and policies, continuous models use generalized coordinates and predictive coding, and mixed models require link factors implementing Bayesian model averaging and comparison.
- Discrete and continuous representations are linked by Bayesian model averaging (descending empirical priors) and Bayesian model comparison (ascending posterior over outcome models); thalamocortical loops may implement this, while expected free energy and policy expectations involve cortico–basal ganglia–thalamic loops.
- In simulations of reading, the model has two discrete hierarchical levels with six sentences and four words, with letters/pictograms in quadrants; saccades are assumed to take about 256 ms, continuous integration uses 24/25 time steps of about 10 ms, and the subject resolves the sentence on the last saccade of the last word.
- Minimizing variational free energy also minimizes Lyapunov exponents, so belief propagation organizes toward critical slowing; self-organized criticality is described as an epiphenomenon of self-evidencing.
Methods
- Theoretical/computational derivation using Bayesian networks, Forney factor graphs, and neural network/circuit mappings; derives belief propagation for discrete, continuous, and mixed generative models.
- Simulation of pictographic reading: two discrete hierarchical levels (six sentences, four words; letters/pictograms in quadrants), a continuous visuomotor model with 32 × 32 pixel images, equations integrated with 16 iterations per time point per discrete level, saccades about 256 ms, continuous integration 24/25 time steps of about 10 ms, and roughly 4.5 s of simulated time.
- Main analysis is simulation-based: eye movements, posterior probabilities/evidence accumulation, simulated firing rates/depolarization, and band-pass filtered local field potentials between 4 Hz and 32 Hz; no empirical dataset is analyzed.
Limitations
- Stated: the neural networks “should not be taken too seriously” and are offered as a starting point for refinement and deconstruction; many anatomical issues are ignored, including direct/indirect pathways and dopamine modulation.
- Stated: the sensory attenuation model is “quite a crude way” of modeling sensory attenuation, and the reading simulation is “a bit abstract.”
- Evident: the anatomical mappings are speculative and not empirically tested here, and the simulation results depend on the model assumptions and message-passing schedule.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Here, the subject correctly infers, on the last saccade of the last word, that the first sentence generated the stimuli.”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > SIMULATIONS OF READING > Categorization and Evidence Accumulation
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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In the paper
“This means that a partially observed sequence of outcomes can inform expectations about the future, which are necessary to evaluate the expected free energy of a policy.”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > DISCRETE GENERATIVE MODELS > Belief Updating and Propagation
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“When a generative model is specified as a factor graph, latent variables can often be inferred by executing a message passing schedule that can be derived automatically.”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > INTRODUCTION
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In the paper
“Factor graphs are an important type of probabilistic graphical model because they facilitate the derivation of (approximate) Bayesian inference algorithms.”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > INTRODUCTION
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Finally, note that the outcomes that inform the expected free energy are not the observed outcomes but predicted outcomes based upon expected states, under each policy (i.e., message 5).”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > DISCRETE GENERATIVE MODELS
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the citing paper
“This means that systems able to make such future-oriented inferences must possess a generative model with temporal or counterfactual depth [26,39].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“In some simulations, one can mix discrete and continuous state-space models by placing the former on top of the latter, to produce deep generative models that, through active inference, can be used to simulate many known aspects of computational anatomy and physiology in the brain [158].”
From The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple (2023) · cites this paper as [158]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“In this sense, it is sometimes referred to as epistemic affordance [158].”
From The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple (2023) · cites this paper as [158]
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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
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In the paper
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > MIXED MODELS
“E(t)m=−lnoτ,m−∫0TL(t)mdtL(t)m=lnP(õ(t)|ηm)−lnP(õ(t)|η).(12)”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > MIXED MODELS
“This equation expresses the free energy E of competing outcome models as the prior surprise plus the log evidence for each outcome model (integrated over time).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > SIMULATIONS OF READING > Categorization and Evidence Accumulation
“This figure illustrates belief propagation (producing the behavior shown in Figure 11), in terms of simulated firing rates and depolarization.”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > SIMULATIONS OF READING
“Figure 12 shows the behavior that results from integrating the message passing scheme described in Figure 10.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > SIMULATIONS OF READING
“each of the 25 time steps of the continuous integration scheme corresponds roughly to 10 ms”
§ The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference > SIMULATIONS OF READING
“This trajectory is shown as a function of the time steps used to integrate the generalized belief updating (24 time steps, each corresponding to about 10 ms of real time).”
Citations
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Felleman, D. J., & Van Essen, D. C. (1991) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/1.1.1 · Cited by 7,783 · cited 2×
“Given that the message passing requires prediction errors on hidden causes to be passed to higher levels, one can assume they are encoded by superficial pyramidal cells; that is, the source of ascending extrinsic connections (Bastos et al., 2012; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Markov et al., 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-organized criticality: An explanation of the 1/f noise
Bak, P., Tang, C., & Wiesenfeld, K. (1987) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.59.381 · Cited by 7,591 · cited 1×
“From the perspective of active inference, this implies self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016), which entails self-organized criticality (Bak et al., 1987) and dynamic connectivity (Allen et al., 2012; Breakspear, 2004).”
BackgroundFactor graphs and the sum-product algorithm
Kschischang, F. R., Frey, B. J., & Loeliger, H.-A. (2001) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/18.910572 · Cited by 6,486
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1×
“In particular, we assume that the brain engages in some form of (Bayesian) inference—and can therefore be described as maximizing Bayesian model evidence (Clark, 2013; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006; Hohwy, 2016; Mumford, 1992).”
BackgroundRao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 2×
“Before considering the implications for hierarchical architectures in the brain, we turn to the equivalent message passing for continuous variables, which transpires to be predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Srinivasan, Laughlin, & Dubs, 1982).”
BackgroundA mechanism for cognitive dynamics: neuronal communication through neuronal coherence.
Fries, P. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.011 · Cited by 4,284 · cited 1×
“…dynamics) mechanism may be particularly important in understanding attention in terms of communication through coherence (Akam & Kullman, 2012; Fries, 2005) and the important role of inhibitory interneurons in mediating synchronous gain control (Kann, Papageorgiou, & Draguhn, 2014; Lee,…”
BackgroundHoeting, J. A., Madigan, D., Raftery, A. E., & Volinsky, C. T. (1999) · Statistical Science · doi:10.1214/ss/1009212519 · Cited by 4,118 · cited 1×
“See K. Friston and Penny (2011) and Hoeting et al. (1999) for details.”
BackgroundPreface: Cerebral Cortex Has Come of Age
Goldman-Rakic, P. S., & Rakic, P. (1991) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/1.1.1-a · Cited by 3,393
Tracking whole-brain connectivity dynamics in the resting state
Allen, E. A., Damaraju, E., Plis, S. M., Erhardt, E. B., Eichele, T., & Calhoun, V. D. (2014) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs352 · Cited by 2,992 · cited 3×
“We focus on the modulation of intrinsic excitability; specifically, the afferents to superficial pyramidal cells—and, as a more abstract level, the implications for self-organized criticality of the sort entailed by dynamic fluctuations in connectivity (Aertsen, Gerstein, Habib, & Palm, 1989; Allen et al., 2012; Baker…”
Research works printed but not linked: 2
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Cited by
Communication dynamics in complex brain networks
Avena-Koenigsberger, A., Misic, B., & Sporns, O. (2018) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.149 · Cited by 856
“How global network architecture shapes the capacity of the system to minimize variational free energy and enact this mechanism is an exciting topic for future research 167 .”
BackgroundThe Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473
Self-citationCellular Mechanisms of Conscious Processing
Aru, J., Suzuki, M., & Larkum, M. E. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.006 · Cited by 321
“These computational theories are predictive coding (PC), which has various implementations [67–69], and active inference [70,71].”
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Hohwy, J. (2020) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12281 · Cited by 247
“If discrete, then it may be easier to map on to (propositional) thought but this will also change neuronal message passing into a different format than predictive coding (Friston et al., 2017).”
BackgroundUncertainty, epistemics and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2017) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0376 · Cited by 252
“In other words, this form of generative model can account for processes with ‘memory’, something that is further enhanced in hierarchical extensions of this model [16,21].”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K. J., Parr, T., & de Vries, B.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
- Corresponding author
- Parr, Thomas
- Venue
- Network Neuroscience
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2017-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 381-414
- ISSN
- 2472-1751 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5798592
- OpenAlex
- W2623066203
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 111
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 56 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 18.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Network Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (088130/Z/09/Z)
- Rosetrees Trust (173346)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- active inference, belief propagation, deep generative models, factor graphs, Bayesian model averaging, thalamocortical loop, functional integration, reading, semantic representation, visual sampling
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