The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption
Abstract
We study the allocation of driver's licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without knowing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries (“agents”). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 2×
“All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries (“agents”).”
Self-citationFighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259 · Cited by 719
Banerjee, A. V. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555484 · Cited by 587
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534
Cited by
In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments
Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.4.200 · Cited by 788
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534
Corruption in Developing Countries
Olken, B., & Pande, R. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17398 · Cited by 470
Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India
Greenstone, M., & Hanna, R. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17210 · Cited by 268
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., Djankov, S., Hanna, R., & Mullainathan, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-11-01
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1639-1676
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2152670203
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 48.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1639
- The paper
- Bertrand, M., Djankov, S., Hanna, R., & Mullainathan, S. (2007). Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1639
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.