The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption
Abstract
We study the allocation of driver's licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without knowing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries (“agents”). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 2×
“All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries (“agents”).”
Self-citationShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118402 · Cited by 3,778
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
(1978) · Cited by 1,723
Eight Questions about Corruption
Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357860 · Cited by 1,699
An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Lui, F. T. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261329 · Cited by 1,304
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
Svensson, J. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535180 · Cited by 1,036
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Olken, B. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11753 · Cited by 824
The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.194 · Cited by 822
In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments
Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.4.200 · Cited by 788
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from “Missing Imports” in China
Fisman, R., & Wei, S. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/381476 · Cited by 749
Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259 · Cited by 719
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
Banerjee, A. V. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555484 · Cited by 587
The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India
Wade, R. (1982) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388208421833 · Cited by 573
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534 · cited 1×
“Examining the subset of participants who began the process by taking the driving test once, we find that a substantial percentage of them (about 35%) failed and must resort to retaking the test or hiring an agent. Most interestingly, this percentage is unrelated to actual ability to drive: it is constant across the le…”
ResultCollusion and the theory of organizations
Tirole, J. (2008) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521430194.003 · Cited by 372
CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. (1978) · Corruption · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-596350-3.50005-3 · Cited by 230
Easterly, W. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.373 · Cited by 227
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence fromPreprint
Fisman, R. J., & Wei, S. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 83
Cited by
Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India
Greenstone, M., & Hanna, R. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.10.3038 · Cited by 1,013
Self-citationElectoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments
Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.4.200 · Cited by 788
Corruption in Developing Countries
Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110917 · Cited by 769
Cai, H., Fang, H., & Xu, L. C. (2011) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/651201 · Cited by 753
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., Djankov, S., Hanna, R., & Mullainathan, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-11-01
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1639-1676
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2152670203
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 48.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.