Impacts of Entry by Counterfeiters*
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, I use a natural experiment to test the impacts of counterfeiting under weak intellectual property rights. I collect new panel data from Chinese shoe companies from 1993-2004. Exploiting the discontinuity of government enforcement efforts for the footwear sector in 1995 and the differences in authentic companies' relationships with the government, I identify and measure the effects of counterfeit entry on authentic prices, qualities, and other market outcomes. The empirical results are explained and generalized by my theoretical framework. First, low-quality counterfeit entrants induce authentic producers to both upgrade product quality and invest in self-enforcement. Second, vertical integration and other costly devices are used for signaling and complementing a company's own enforcements against counterfeits. Third, all these strategies push up authentic prices and are effective in reducing counterfeit sales.
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Citations
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“Timing of India’s foreign direct investment liberalization reform in 1991 Ramani and Srinivasan (2019) How do firms respond to foreign direct investment liberalization?”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Qian, Y.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-11
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1577-1609
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2170750574
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 57.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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