The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Superstar CEOs*
Open accessAbstract
Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the United States follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of “superstars” enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the awards, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.
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Cites
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Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
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Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552775 · Cited by 3,894
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Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds
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Executive compensation as an agency problem
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Cited by
Syverson, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.326 · Cited by 2,942
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006 · Cited by 993
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001 · Cited by 745
CEO network centrality and merger performance
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., & Jandik, T. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.01.001 · Cited by 585
CEO Sociopolitical Activism: A Stakeholder Alignment Model
Hambrick, D. C., & Wowak, A. J. (2021) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2018.0084 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Malmendier, U., & Tate, G.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-11
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1593-1638
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W4240193059
- Cited by
- 676
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 74.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
