Superstar CEOs*
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the United States follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of “superstars” enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the awards, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90023-5 · Cited by 25,754
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Does the Stock Market Overreact?
De BONDT, W. F. M., & THALER, R. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x · Cited by 7,578
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0006 · Cited by 4,245
Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552775 · Cited by 3,894
The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983) · Biometrika · doi:10.2307/2335942 · Cited by 3,261
Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261535 · Cited by 3,025
Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/209601 · Cited by 2,751
Executive compensation as an agency problem
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2009) · The Economic Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.026 · Cited by 2,282
Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris
Hayward, M. L. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393810 · Cited by 1,787
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhi030 · Cited by 1,664
Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects
Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2011) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2009.07333 · Cited by 1,416
Implementing Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects in Stata
Abadie, A., Drukker, D., Herr, J. L., & Imbens, G. W. (2004) · The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata · doi:10.1177/1536867x0400400307 · Cited by 1,386
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
CREMERS, K. J. M., & NAIR, V. B. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x · Cited by 1,220
Do investors overvalue firms with bloated balance sheets?
Hirshleifer, D., Hou, K., Teoh, S. H., & Zhang, Y. (2004) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.10.002 · Cited by 803
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2532 · Cited by 783
Using matching, instrumental variables and control functions to estimate economic choice models
Heckman, J., & Navarro-Lozano, S. (2004) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465304323023660 · Cited by 768
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.278920 · Cited by 703
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.163914 · Cited by 681
Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns
Yermack, D. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.002 · Cited by 536
Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score
Hirano, K., Imbens, G. W., & Ridder, G. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.324940 · Cited by 480
Are perks purely managerial excess?
Rajan, R. G., & Wulf, J. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.01.003 · Cited by 302
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12365 · Cited by 276
Using Matching, Instrumental Variables and Control Functions to Estimate Economic Choice Models
Heckman, J. J., & Navarro-Lozano, S. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.403961 · Cited by 203
Cited by
Syverson, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.326 · Cited by 2,942
The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1163 · Cited by 1,588
External Networking and Internal Firm Governance
FRACASSI, C., & TATE, G. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01706.x · Cited by 1,027
Self-citationBebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006 · Cited by 993
CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies
Serfling, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.013 · Cited by 904
Metadata
- Authors
- Malmendier, U., & Tate, G.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-11
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1593-1638
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W4240193059
- Cited by
- 676
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 74.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.