The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions
Open accessAbstract
Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real estate agents have an incentive to convince clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired to when an agent sells his own home. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for 3.7% more than other houses and stay on the market 9.5 days longer, controlling for observables. Greater information asymmetry leads to larger distortions.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Levitt, S. D., & Syverson, C.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2008-11
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 599-611
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W3021488820
- Cited by
- 604
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 37.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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