The Conceptual Evolution of DSM-5
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Abstract
This volume, based on the proceedings of the 2009 annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, reflects the midstream thinking of many of the individuals involved in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5) process. The volume sections are devoted to the major innovations of the DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups: conceptual issues concerning validity, the introduction of dimensional assessment into the categoryoriented DSMs, the role of functional impairment, and the recognition of cultural, sex, and developmental aspects in a psychiatric nosology. In the Introduction to this volume (a reprint of Regier et al., 2009), the editors review the history of the DSM process since the publication of groundbreaking articles by Robins and Guze (1970) and Feighner et al. (1972) and the implementation of the ‘‘Feighner diagnostic criteria’’ in DSM-III in 1980. In contrast to the DSM-5 white papers, published as A Research Agenda for DSM-V in 2002 (Kupfer et al, 2002), in which the editors of that volume offered a guarded judgment that, although diagnostic reliability had been achieved, validity remained an elusive goal with the Robins/Guze validators, the editors of this volume declare the Robins/ Guze validators to be unachievable, unscientific, and, in effect, dead. They further acknowledge that the usual distinction between diagnostic reliability and validity is flawed. That is, the reliability achieved through strict criteria sets and categorical diagnoses can inhibit as well as promote research, and it can produce artificial diagnostic entities that do not reflect the real world of psychopathology, in which symptoms and categories blur and overlap. The authors review the long list of problems associated with the category-based DSM-III and DSM-IV: overlapping boundaries (lack of ‘‘zones of rarity’’; Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) among categorical diagnoses, high rates of comorbidity and not otherwise specified diagnoses, lack of biological markers for the DSM-IV categories, and failure to discover genetic, physiologic, or neuroscientific foundations for these categories. If the categorical approach has painted us into a diagnostic corner, the way out of that corner for the architects of DSM-5 is through the introduction of dimensions. ‘‘The single most important precondition for moving forward to improve the clinical and scientific utility of DSM-5 will be the incorporation of simple dimensional measures for assessing syndromes within broad diagnostic categories and supraordinate dimensions that cross-current diagnostic boundaries. Thus, we have decided that one of the majorVif not the majorV differences between DSM-IV and DSM-5 will be the more prominent use of dimensional measures in DSM-5’’(p. 17). The theme of dimensional assessment occupies 7 of the 15 volume chapters (some quite readable, others more technical). Given the importance of that innovation in DSM-5, as well as its controversial nature in comparison with the other innovations dealt with in the volume, I will focus this brief review on the issue of dimensions. The dimensional approach is offered as a solution to two kinds of problems, both mentioned above, inherent in DSM-III and DSM-IV. On the one hand, the categorical approach has produced artificial boundaries among disorders that have not been supported by clinical research and that lead to high levels of comorbidity and NOS diagnoses. The prospective dimensionsV both spectral dimensions for particular categorical diagnoses and cross-cutting dimensions for all psychiatric presentationsVoffer a way out of the strictures of categorical diagnoses. If psychiatric conditions are viewed as existing along spectra, including overlapping spectra, concerns about requiring ‘‘zones of rarity’’ to claim validity for the current categories simply drop out. The dimensional approach is also offered as a solution to a second kind of problem that bedevils DSM-III and DSM-IV, namely, the fact that, at this point, we have no biological foundationVphysiologic, neuroscientific, geneticVto ground our DSM categories. Dimensional analysis, it is hoped, will provide us with symptom clusters that will more closely resemble real-world psychopathology. In that way, they will also guide us more accurately toward the biological foundation that continues to elude us. This second claim for the dimensional approach does seem overblown, given that we have so little sense of how the nosological picture will look once the neuroscientific and genetic dust has settled in the coming decades. Aside from the theoretical question of how much a dimensional approach will contribute to diagnostic validity, I will focus on two issues of a more practical nature that the authors of this volume did not deal with adequately. The first has to do with the integration of dimensional scales into DSM-5, and the second involves the question of research and clinical utility of the dimensional approach. Exemplary of the first issue is Steven Hyman’s fine, albeit controversial, chapter, Diagnosis of Mental Disorders in Light of Modern Genetics. Hyman begins with a review of the problems attendant on establishing rigid diagnostic categories to achieve reliability, then reviews the chaotic state of current family and genetic studies, and ends with a section entitled What Is to Be Done? He begins this final section with a statement that could have been written by the unmentioned éminence grise (or as the editors might say, the Darth Veder) of this volume, Allen Frances: ‘‘Ithe DSM revision process should be extremely conservative with respect to existing categorical disorders, because even small changes in wording could produce significant disruptions to epidemiology, clinical trials inclusion criteria, and laboratory research; such disruptions would militate against tinkering without very strong justification’’(p. 11). Hyman follows that statement with this one: ‘‘A more important goal for DSM-5 is to make structural alterations that will facilitate discoveries the hasten the development of usefully valid diagnoses, new treatment approaches, and a sounder basis for clinical and translational research.’’ He then goes on to describe the restructuring of the manual with dimensional measures. Earlier in the chapter, he had described the challenges of the DSM-5 Task Force as including the restructuring of the manual in such ways while at the same time ‘‘Doing all this without damaging clinical practice or administrative uses of DSM classification.’’ This reader can only respond, Whoa! What on earth are you talking about? You’re going to ‘‘think deeply about the structure of the manual,’’ reorganize it as just described, but somehow not tinker with the existing categorical disorders? If you can square this circle, please let us know how. The second issue that emerges with the dimensional thrust of DSM-5 is that of utility. It has been an act of faith for DSM authors (see the Introductions in the DSM-III and DSM-IV manuals) that what is useful for researchers is useful for clinicians, and vice versa. The diagnostic criteria were said to be equally valuable for both groups, and there has been little challenge to this belief. In questioning the assumption of equal usefulness, now in the context of dimensions, we recall, first, that the title of the classic Feighner article was ‘‘Diagnostic Criteria for Use in Psychiatric Research,’’ and second, that the ICD-10 section on psychiatric disorders is divided into two parts: the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders and the Diagnostic Criteria for Research. That is, what the BOOK REVIEW
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Metadata
- Authors
- Narrow, W. E., Kuhl, E. A., & Kupfer, D. J.
- Venue
- American Psychiatric Association Publishing eBooks
- Published
- 2010-11-03
- OpenAlex
- W2971307468
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 31.98
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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