The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development
Abstract
We investigate how state capacity—the administrative ability to formulate and implement policy—affects the institutional adoption of new policies and the decoupling of those policies from their original purpose in the face of pressures from professions, multilateral agencies, and imitation among countries. We expect state capacity to reduce the effect of professional and imitation influences, to increase the impact of coercive effects by multilateral agencies, and to lessen decoupling between policies’ adoption and desired outcomes. We tested these predictions using a unique longitudinal dataset on the adoption of minority shareholders’ legal protections and the development of the stock market in 78 countries between 1970 and 2011. We found evidence consistent with the moderating effects of state capacity on institutional adoption and on lessening policy–practice decoupling. Our findings suggest that the strength of state capacity influences which policy models policymakers select and adopt, whether they implement them effectively, and what the consequences of such adoption are.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 7×
“The protection of property rights is supposed to make investments in stocks more attractive by reducing the possibility of expropriation by either the incumbent management or large investors (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000).”
BackgroundInfluentialStates and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China
Skocpol, T. (1979) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815805 · Cited by 5,408 · cited 1×
“…integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state’s ability to implement policies. . . . Loyal and skilled officials and plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining all sorts of goals’’ (Skocpol, 1979: 16).”
BackgroundBringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research
Skocpol, T. (1985) · Bringing the State Back In · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628283.002 · Cited by 2,370
Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance
Lazonick, W., & O'Sullivan, M. (2000) · Economy and Society · doi:10.1080/030851400360541 · Cited by 1,970
Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression
Jaccard, J., & Turrisi, R. (2003) · doi:10.4135/9781412984522 · Cited by 1,797
From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world
Bromley, P., & Powell, W. W. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.684462 · Cited by 1,656
The institutional environment for economic growth
Henisz, W. J. (2000) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00066 · Cited by 1,651
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231170 · Cited by 1,237
Cited by
The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism
Guriev, S., & Rachinsky, A. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330053147994 · Cited by 453
Dorobantu, S., Kaul, A., & Zelner, B. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2590 · Cited by 441
Government's green grip: Multifaceted state influence on corporate environmental actions in China
Wang, R., Wijen, F., & Heugens, P. P. M. A. R. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2714 · Cited by 433
Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research
Hanson, J. K., & Sigman, R. (2021) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/715066 · Cited by 414
Metadata
- Authors
- Guillén, M. F., & Capron, L.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-08-12
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 125-160
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W2234397921
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 87.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0001839215601459
- The paper
- Guillén, M. F., & Capron, L. (2016). State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839215601459
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.