The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Group Size and Collective Action: Third-party Monitoring in Common-pool Resources
Abstract
This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.
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Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
(2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim210040063 · Cited by 8,972
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.9739 · Cited by 3,732
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation
Agrawal, A., & Gibson, C. C. (1999) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(98)00161-2 · Cited by 2,908
Self-citationBuchanan, J. M. (1965) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552442 · Cited by 2,820
Hardin, R. (1982) · doi:10.56021/9780801828188 · Cited by 1,230
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?Preprint
Baland, J., & Platteau, J. (2000) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,191
Cited by
Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources
Agrawal, A. (2001) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00063-8 · Cited by 2,025
Self-citationHeterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management
Poteete, A. R., & Ostrom, E. (2004) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00360.x · Cited by 667
Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics
Agrawal, A. (2003) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.32.061002.093112 · Cited by 653
Self-citationOperationalizing the social-ecological systems framework to assess sustainability
Leslie, H. M., Basurto, X., Nenadovic, M., Sievanen, L., Cavanaugh, K. C., Cota-Nieto, J. J., Erisman, B. E., Finkbeiner, E., Hinojosa-Arango, G., Moreno-Báez, M., et al. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1414640112 · Cited by 375
Institutional fit and the sustainability of social–ecological systems
Epstein, G., Pittman, J., Alexander, S. M., Berdej, S., Dyck, T., Kreitmair, U., Rathwell, K. J., Villamayor-Tomas, S., Vogt, J., & Armitage, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability · doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2015.03.005 · Cited by 355
Metadata
- Authors
- AGRAWAL, A., & GOYAL, S.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-02
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 63-93
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2070072990
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 22.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.