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Cited by 199

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises

GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA, SMITH, ALASTAIR·2002·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Traditional arguments that link credibility to a reputation for resolve, power, or strength are contrasted with a model that posits that credibility arises from the expectation of future, continued gains from retaining an honest record. Diplomatic statements are believed only if a country's or leader's credibility is unmarred. Leaders keep their word so that they are believed in later crises. Two environments are contrasted: one in which a country's record for honesty resides within the country as a whole and another in which reputation resides with individual leaders. In this latter case, citizens have an incentive to remove leaders caught bluffing. More robust than previous reputation theories, this model also offers comparative statics for when diplomacy will be more effective—namely, when leaders are domestically accountable.

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Metadata

Authors
GUISINGER, A., & SMITH, A.
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2002-04
Volume
46
Issue
2
Pages
175-200
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2091009045
Cited by
199
References
2
FWCI
30.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002702046002001
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GUISINGER, A., & SMITH, A. (2002). Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046002001

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.